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Riggs and Proffitt: Rehnquist Judicial Philosophy

THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
by
ROBERT E. RIGGS* AND THOMAS D. PROFFITT**

N JANUARY

1983, Justice Rehnquist completed his eleventh year as an

Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The record of more
than a decade is extensive enough to permit serious appraisal of his work, and
his distinctive impact on the Court clearly justifies the undertaking. This article
will identify some of the values underlying his judicial decision-making which,
in the aggregate, may be said to constitute a philosophy of constitutional adjudication. Although the range of possibly relevant values is very broad, this article
will focus on Justice Rehnquist's concept of the judicial review function, his
perception of certain fundamental constitutional norms, and, to a lesser extent,
his ideological orientations.
In defining the contours of the Rehnquist judicial philosophy, this article
will examine three sources: (1) ideas articulated by Justice Rehnquist in opinions
and other writings, (2) values implicit in his pattern of decision-making as
distilled from the decided cases, and (3)ideas attributed to him by others. Information from each source will be examined separately for light it sheds on the
Rehnquist judicial philosophy, and each is assigned its own label. Thus, this
article will refer to the self-articulatedphilosophy (as reflected in the Justice's
writings), the attributedphilosophy (as reflected in the writings of others), and
the operative philosophy (as reflected in the decision record). Value patterns
revealed by the three sources will, of course, overlap substantially, and one
important focus of inquiry is the congruence between the self-articulated notions
of constitutional adjudication and the values implicit in the case decisions. In
all of this information this article will look for a pattern which may appropriately
be labeled Justice Rehnquist's judicial philosophy.
I. THE REHNQUIST APPOINTMENT
At the time of his nomination to the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist
had no judicial track record and had articulated little in the way of judicial
philosophy. The press' and those who testified in the hearings on his nomination'
*Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.A., M.A., LL.B., University of Arizona; Ph.D.,
University of Illinois.
**Law Clerk to Judge Aldon J. Anderson, United States District Court for the District of Utah. B.A.,
MA., J.D., Brigham Young University.
'See, e.g., Rehnquist: A Lawyer's Lawyer, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1, 1971, at 18; Sperling, Law, Order - and
Prestige- For Court, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 3; Rosenbaum, William Hubbs
Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 25, col. 7; Clawson, William H. Rehnquist, Washington Post,
Oct. 22, 1971, at A8, col. 6.
'Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to be Associate
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depicted him as a political conservative with excellent legal credentials. Both
characterizations were accurate. His academic record had been distinguished
in every respect. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa in political science from Stanford
University in 1948 and earned a Stanford M.A. in 1949. The following year
he took a second M.A. in government from Harvard University. In 1952, he
graduated first in his class from Stanford Law School, where he served as a
Law Review editor and was named to the Order of the Coif. As a law student
he was subsequently described by one of his professors as "nothing short of
brilliant." 3 Upon graduation from law school he was honored by appointment
as clerk to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson. Although born in
Milwaukee (1924), he chose to enter practice in Phoenix, Arizona. During sixteen
years of practice in Phoenix with four different law firms, he gained a reputation for integrity, diligence, high professional competence, and unusual intellectual capacity. 4 In February 1969, he received a Nixon appointment as Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice, where he served until his confirmation as a member of the
United States Supreme Court.
Despite his good record and recognized legal abilities, his nomination to
the Supreme Court was not uniformly greeted with enthusiasm. Those who
questioned or opposed the nomination were mainly civil libertarians concerned about his past support of various conservative causes and principles. He
had been an active supporter of the Goldwater presidential candidacy in 1964.
He was on record as a vocal critic of the liberal Warren Court.5 He had resisted
efforts to eliminate "de facto" school desegregation in Phoenix and had actively
urged rejection of a Phoenix city ordinance prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations. 6 He also opposed portions of a Model State AntiJustices of the Supreme Court of the United States: HearingsBefore the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Nomination Hearings]. See, e.g.,
id. at 198 (statement of Howard Karman, President, Arizona State Bar Association); id. at 441 (statement
of the Hon. Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Congressman from California).
'Letter from John B. Hurlbut, Eli Reynolds Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford Law School, to Senator
James 0. Eastland (Oct. 28, 197 1), reprintedin Nomination Hearings,supranote 2, at 19. Another teacher
stated:
Rehnquist was a student of mine at Stanford Law School. He was not only the top student
in his class but one of the best students in the School over a number of years. He has remained
in my mind as one of the most impressive students I have had in some twenty-two years of teaching.
Letter from Phil C. Neal to Senator James 0. Eastland (Nov. 10, 1971), reprintedin Nomination Hearings,
supra note 2, at 11.
'See Nomination Hearings,supra note 2, at 1-16 (numerous testimonials). One enthusiastic endorsement
came from a former Stanford Law School classmate, then Arizona State Senator, Sandra D. O'Connor,
who attested that "he has the potential to become one of the greatest jurists of our highest court...
he ... was head and shoulders above all the rest of us in terms of sheer legal talent and ability." Id.
at 12 (testimony of Sandra D. O'Connor).
'Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957,
at 74, 75; N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at 26, col. 1.
'N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1971, at E4, col. 4. His more fair-minded critics conceded that his opposition to
the equal public accommodations measure was based on "philosophical grounds and concerned only the
merits of pending legislation." Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, Chairman, American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary to Senator James 0. Eastland (Nov. 2, 1971), reprinted in
Nomination Hearings,supra note 2, at 1, 4.
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Discrimination Act while a representative to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 7 While assistant attorney general he spoke
out vigorously in support of the administration's law-and-order position on
wiretaps, pretrail detention, summary arrest procedures, obscenity, and civil
disobedience - positions almost uniformly anathema to the liberal
establishment.' Largely because of this record, twenty-six senators voted against

confirmation.' A number of Senators who disagreed strongly with his political
views voted for confirmation because they were unwilling to reject on ideological
grounds a candidate who was otherwise obviously qualified.10
During the Hearing process Justice Rehnquist was himself subjected to
extensive questioning, and his comments did little to dispel the image of political
conservatism. While he denied the more extreme charges of insensitivity to individual rights" and indicated a change of heart on the Phoenix public accommodations ordinance which he had opposed in 1964, " his opinions still came
through with a very conservative cast. When questioned about his personal

views, he frequently found some reason not to respond. As a judicial nominee
he could not make predictions about "what he would do on a specific fact
'Nomination of William H. Rehnquist, S. REP. No. 16, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-36 (1971). This report
includes a 30-page memorandum by dissenting members of the Judiciary Committee stating the case against
confirmation of the appointment. Id. at 26.
'Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 137-96; Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth: The Department
of Justice under John Mitchell, 12 ARIz. L. REV. 251 (1970); Shannon, A Question or Threefor Nominee
Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1971, at E4, col. 1.
'The vote was 68-26, contrasting with the 89-1 endorsement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., nominated at the
same time to fill a second vacancy on the Court. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1971, at 1, col. 3; id., Dec. 7,
1971, at 1,col. 4.
"By a 9-3 vote the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary gave Rehnquist the highest possible
endorsement, based on "professional competence, judicial temperament, and integrity." The minority
of three found him qualified but were unwilling to express the same high degree of support. Nomination
Hearings,supranote 2, at 4. Justice Powell, by contrast, received the highest endorsement by a unanimous
vote. The dilemma of conscientious liberals is well expressed in a statement issued by Arizona Representative
Morris K. Udall:
It's natural to feel some pride when a man from one's own state and one's own professional
group is nominated for a position carrying the awesome responsibility of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Thus, the President's selection of William Rehnquist stirs such pride.
At the same time, I must acknowledge that I would not have nominated Mr. Rehnquist had
the choice been mine.
I say this though I can attest to his complete integrity and adherence to the highest ethical
standards. In addition he has excellent legal training and experience and possesses a clearly superior
legal mind. He certainly meets the demanding professional standards for and would bring intellectual
distinction to the Supreme Court.
Having said that, however, I must register my strong disagreement with Mr. Rehnquist's
philosophy. I consider many of his publicly expressed views to be misguided and wrong.
Yet I believe that a President has the right to appoint judges of his own political and judicial
philosophy and that his nominees should generally be confirmed when they meet ethical and
professional standards, as Mr. Rehnquist obviously does.
Furthermore, we have learned that it is risky business to predict the course a lawyer will take
when he leaves the political arena and begins a lifetime judicial appointment. And so I can be hopeful
that as a Supreme Court justice, Mr. Rehnquist will acquire different perspectives.
Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Morris K. Udall).
"E.g., Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 71-72, 77.
"Id. at 70, 77.
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situation or a particular doctrine after it reaches the court."' 3 He could not
properly express a view "on the constitutionality of a measure pending in
Congress."' 4 As a former "advocate and spokesman" for the Justice Department, "it would be inappropriate" for him to give a personal view on matters
he had handled in that capacity. 5 Nevertheless, his remarks, though guarded,
reflected a continuing sympathy for the politically conservative positions he
had previously espoused. 6 At one point in the hearings, he tacitly assented
when Senator Mathias referred to his political views as "conservative."' 7
The hearings also gave some clues to his judicial philosophy, as distinguished from his political ideology. While he did not attach the label of "conservative" to his views, his comments left no doubt that he thought the label
was appropriate. "I subscribe unreservedly," he said:
to that philosophy, that when you put on the robe, you are not there to
enforce your own notions as to what is desirable public policy. You are
there to construe as objectively as you possibly can the Constitution of
the United States, the statutes of Congress, and whatever relevant legal
materials there may be in the case before you.' 8
The resemblance between this statement of philosophy and his definition of
judicial conservatism is obviously more than coincidental. As he subsequently
said in the same interchange with Senator Mathias:
I think . . . there has been a tendency to equate conservatism of
judicial philosophy not with a conservative political bias, but with a
tendency to want to assure one's self that the Constitution does indeed
require a particular result before saying so, and to equate liberalism with
a feeling that . . . the person tends to read his own views into the
Constitution.' 9
In elaborating his own position, he referred more than once to the importance
' 31d. at 26. Cf. id. at 141, 157.
'4d. at 33.
"Id. at 51. See also, id. at 142.
"See, e.g., Nomination Hearings,supra note 2, at 139-40 (comments on electronic surveillance); id. at
43-45 (summary arrest procedures); id. at 166 (civil disobedience); id. at 41 (suppression of the Pentagon
Papers); id. at 70, 156 (school busing).
"Id. at 156. The relevant exchange ran as follows:
Senator MATHIAS. It has been said here and elsewhere that your political views tend to be
conservative. What effect, assuming this is the case, will this have on you as a judge and, consequently,
as a man who should be able to decide cases impartially?
Mr. REHNQUIST. I would hope none. I realize that that is the same question I would be asking a
nominee if I were a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and I cast about for some way
of perhaps giving some objective evidence of the fact, rather than simply asking you to rely on
my assurance.
Id. Subsequently Rehnquist observed that it was "difficult to pin down the terms 'liberal' and 'conservative,' " and that "they may mean something different when one is talking about a political alinement
[sic.] as opposed to a judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court." Id.
'Id. at 156.
"Id. at 157.
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of construing constitutional language in light of the framers' intent as determined from historical materials2" regardless of any personal inclination to keep
the Constitution "in step with the times." 2 ' Though such remarks certainly
revealed no detailed, coherent judicial philosophy, they suggest an orientation
that places greater emphasis on the language of the original document and the
circumstances surrounding its adoption than upon current societal needs and
values. This is a position commonly identified with judicial conservatism.
The senatorial inquisitors specifically sought the nominee's views on the
importance of prior judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions, and
here Justice Rehnquist was more equivocal. While precedent should, in general,
be accorded "great weight," 22 it should receive "somewhat less weight in the
field of constitutional law" than in other areas of the law, and less weight in
a case decided by a narrow majority than one decided unanimously.2 3 Recent
precedents, likewise, are entitled to less respect than more venerable decisions
that have stood the test of reexamination by numerous judges over a longer
period of time.24 Such readiness to reexamine precedent is not often identified
with the conservative judicial temperament. 5
II.

THE ATTRIBUTED PHILOSOPHY: REHNQUIST AND THE
COMMENTATORS SINCE

1972

In the years since Justice Rehnquist joined the Court, commentators have
continued to echo the two themes that pervaded the debate over his nomination: his legal acumen and his ideological conservatism. An early appraisal by
journalist Warren Weaver is typical:
In two-and-a-half terms on the high tribunal, Associate Justice Rehnquist has established himself firmly as a one-man strong right wing, a constructionist so strict as to make Chief Justice Warren Burger look permissive on occasion, a man seemingly dedicated to cleansing singlehandedly
if necessary, the Augean stable that conservative dogma percieves as the
Supreme Court of the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties. 26
Regarding his abilities, Weaver stated, "Rehnquist's youthfulness has hardly
impeded the growth of his reputation for intellect ...While lawyers hesitate
to make invidious comparisons among the learned justices, a sizeable number
regard Rehnquist as having the best mind on the Court." 27 More recent journalistic comment continues to emphasize both the intellect and the
"E.g., id.at 55, 81-82, 138, 167. See also id. at 19.
"Id. at 81.
"1Id. at 19.
"Id. See also id.at 138.
14Id. at 19, 55.

"Rydell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial Self-Restraint, 26

HASTINGS L.J. 875, 913-14 (1975).
"Weaver, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Dissenting, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
2 7Id.
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conservatism."

Such observations are illustrative of a fairly broad consensus and are not
limited to journalists. Comment by lawyers, professors and other students of
the court has run along much the same lines. A sampling of studies dealing
with the Supreme Court as a whole, or its members generally, produces such
qualitative appraisals as "astoundingly conservative" but a "first-rate independent intellect" ;29 a "brilliant ideological conservative";" a man of "powerful
intellectual ability"; 3' "the philosopher" of the Burger Court; a person of
"superior intellect and formidable legal skills," but also a "zealot" who favors
"construing the Constitution as an activist devoted to achieving the supremacy
of political conservatism."" Statistical studies have generally omitted reference
to the intellect but have carefully documented Justice Rehnquist's place on the
ideological right-wing of the Court by reference to his voting position on such
defendant, other individual rights,
broad issues as the rights of the criminal
' 1' 4
economics.
Deal
and issues of "New
Most of the preceding evaluations are drawn from general analyses which
deal with Justice Rehnquist as but one of nine members of the Court. A few
published articles focussing exclusively on the Rehnquist record have attempted
to explain his judicial behavior in more detail. One early law review comment,
based largely on cases decided during the 1971-72 term, placed Justice Rehnquist
at mid-spectrum "between the Court's classic conservatives and its vigorous
liberals."" The center position was attributed to a balance of two, often conflicting, elements in Justice Rehnquist's judicial philosophy: a belief in
"maximum freedom of conduct in personal affairs" tempered by deference
to societal36 interests "where conflict existed between societal and individual
interest.'

"See, e.g., B.

WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). The authors characterize the Justice

as "very bright and extremely conservative." Id. at 161.
29J. SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE 240-41 (1973).

11H.

ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 11-12 (1974).

11C.

BARNES, MEN OF THE SUPREME COURT: PROFILES OF THE JUSTICES

129 (1978).
PROBS. 101, 125 (1980).
&
CONTEMP.
43
LAW
Years,
Ten
"Frank, The Burger Court - The First
as an activist devoted
Constitution
the
construing
favored
who
a
zealot
of
being
""He gave every indication
to achieving the supremacy of political conservatism." L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 54, 57-58 (1974). See
also e.g., L. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 126-27 (1981); A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSrY, THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED JUSTICES 70-71 (1978).

"For a discussion of "New Deal economics" as an issue category, see H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY
MAKING 130-31 & passim (1979). The category includes cases dealing with such matters as antitrust,
worker's compensation, state regulation of business, public utilities, securities regulation, natural resources,
rights of unions, and rights of Indians. The grouping of cases in this (and other Spaeth categories) was
accomplished by a statistical clustering process, and the "New Dealism" label was applied subsequently
as a term broadly descriptive of the cases that statistically had clustered in this group. See also S. GOLDMAN
& A. SARAT, AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 420 (1978); Spaeth & Teger, Activism and Restraint:A Cloak
for Justices' Policy References, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb ed.
1982); Schultz & Howard, The Myth of Swing Voting: An Analysis of Voting Patternson the Supreme
Court, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 798 (1975); Ulmer & Stookey, Nixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A
Statistical Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 331 (1975).
"Reimenschneider, The Judicial Philosophy of William H. Rehnquist, 45 Miss. L.J. 224, 244 (1974).
"Id. at 228.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/1
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Subsequent appraisals of Rehnquist's judicial behavior have tended to
assume his political conservatism but have differed on his status as a judicial
conservative. From a reading of cases dealing with civil liberties during the
first three Rehnquist terms, Rydell was convinced that the Rehnquist opinions
embodied a philosophy of "judicial conservatism" or "judicial self-restraint." 37
This appeared mainly in extreme deference to legislative determinations at the
expense of individual liberties and in a tendency to avoid deciding constitutional issues by "narrowing the concept of justiciability .... "38 A more recent
evaluation by Lind, relying primarily upon Justice Rehnquist's labor opinions,
avoids the use of the "conservative" label but nevertheless identifies aspects
of his judicial orientation that are commonly associated with judicial
conservatism. 9 Lind found "the most important elements of Justice Rehnquist's
jurisprudence" to be "his consistent focus on federalism, his belief in textual
interpretation, and his utilitarian application of the First Amendment in specific
contexts." ' By "focus on federalism," Lind meant deference to state power
which, in the labor context, reflected a tendency to limit the authority of the
National Labor Relations Board.' The second element, "belief in textual interpretation," refers to Justice Rehnquist's insistence that "[sjpecific text within
the Constitution and its amendments must be given the full force of its language
as understood by the Framers,"" 2 and that general language must be interpreted
to correspond with the Framers' intent where ascertainable. In first amendment analysis, however, Lind perceived the Justice as shifting from a textual
to a "contextual" 3 approach, that is, going out of his way to find contextual
factors (frequently the property rights of employers) that might justify governmental restrictions upon speech in derogation of the first amendment's textually
broad guarantee."
"Rydell, supra note 25, at 875.
"Id. at 911. Rydell recognized that Justice Rehnquist's behavior did not satisfy a third element of judicial
self-restraint, i.e., respect for stare decisis. He explained this by observing that prior precedent "may dictate
intervention," in which case the cause of judicial restraint, defined as "reducing the Court's role in society,"
may be served only by ignoring prior interventionist precedent. Id. at 913.
"Lind, Justice Rehnquist: First Amendment Speech in the Labor Context, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93
(1980).
"°Id. at 94.
"'Id.at 94, 97-102.
11Id. at 103.
11Id. at 108.
"For a third commentary on the Rehnquist judicial philosophy, also with a limited substantive focus,
see Justice, A Relativistic Constitution, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 19 (1980). The author, William W. Justice,
a United States district court judge, makes a somewhat tedentious attack on Justice Rehnquist's philosophy
as "moral relativism" that recognizes no value as intrinsically "better or worse than any others," and
implies "that any law more permanent than what a given majority favors is unwarranted." Id. 24, 27.
See also, Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with
an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982). Weisberg analogizes Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 396 (1976), to Captain Vere's trial and execution of Billy
Budd in the Melville novel. Weisberg's rhetorical analysis of Vere's comments during the course of the
trial illustrates how "the verbally and hierarchically superior adjudicator can give the force of seeming
legality to drastic decisions the law does not support," Weisberg at 37-8, and how legal argument can
be used "to distort the law to further purely subjective ends." Id. at 38. Weisberg finds Paul v. Davis
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Other recent analyses have vigorously challenged the characterization of
Rehnquist as a "judicial conservative." In a brief sketch prepared for a special
Supreme Court issue of The NationalLaw Journal,Professor Soifer concluded
that Justice Rehnquist virtually defied classification in "a general taxonomy
of the court, or ... in an intellectual or political tradition .... -""The Justice
was "neither libertarian, strict constructionist nor conservative." 46 On the other
hand, Soifer attributed to Rehnquist a number of specific attitudes that are
commonly identified with today's politicalconservative - solicitude for property rights, distrust of big federal government, a belief in states' rights, and
a concern for law and order. 7 Perhaps, as Soifer suggests, Justice Rehnquist's
outspoken disregard of strict stare decisis may disqualify him as an "institutional conservative," ' "4but the article does little to dispel the image of the Justice
as a political conservative.
This is essentially the same dichotomy posed by Yale Law Professor Owen
Fiss and New Republic editor Charles Krauthammer in a recent article bemoaning the advent of the "Rehnquist Court.""9 Rehnquist, they argue, has emerged
as unmistakable leader of a "so-called" " 'conservative' " bloc on the Supreme
Court.' ° Qualified for this role by both intellect and ideology, 5I he has become
"a hero to the conservatives" through his judicial championing of state
autonomy. 2 Nevertheless, he is not a "conservative," as that term is ordinarily
"understood in the law, but a revisionist of a particular ideological bent. He
repudiates precedents; he shows no deference to the legislative branch [Congress?]; and he is unable to ground state autonomy in any textual provision
of the Constitution."" Instead of conservatism, his judicial orientation merely
reflects a single-minded pursuit of state autonomy in the interests of private
property, at the expense of liberty and equality.14 Fiss and Krauthammer thus
appear to be making a distinction between political and judicial conservatism.
Justice Rehnquist may be politically conservative, but he is definitely not a
judicial conservative."
"a remarkable analogue to Melville's novella," id. at 43, and a contemporary illustration of how claims
may be denied, "perhaps wrongly, with the help of the crafty use of language and form .... " Id. at
58. Most of the article is a highly fascinating analysis of Captain Vere's rhetoric and motivations in the
Billy Budd trial, but in a 16-page application of his methods to Paul v. Davis, Weisberg brilliantly does
a job on Justice Rehnquist.
"Soifer, Rehnquist: Trying to Recapture an Imaginary, Idyllic Past, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 18, 1980, at 21.
"Id. at 28.
"7d.at 21, 28.
"Id. at 21.
"Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW

REPUBLIC,

March 10, 1982, at 14.

50Id.

before he joined the Court, Rehnquist ardently and aggressively fought against the liberal ideas
that were to find their deepest expression in the Warren Court." Id.
11Id. at 18.
"Id. at 18, 20.
"Id. at 21.
"The authors stop short of labeling Justice Rehnquist either a political or judicial "conservative."
Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the implication that a person who is an ardent opponent ot "liberal 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/1
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This conclusion is also endorsed by Jeff Powell, a student of Fiss, in an
insightful study of Justice Rehnquist's concept of federalism.56 Although
somewhat tentative about attributing Rehnquist's judicial behavior to political
conservatism, Powell nevertheless accepts "for the purpose of discussion the
standard liberal view of Justice Rehnquist as a right-wing ideologue, unsympathetic to claims based on individual liberties," and concedes "that most of Rehnquist's federalism positions dovetail nicely with conservative politics ...."I"
On the question of judicialconservatism, Powell is not in the least tentative:
"Justice Rehnquist is clearly and consciously, not a strict constructionist and
not a practitioner of judicial restraint.' 58 Quite the contrary, in the implementation of his views on federalism the justice has adopted "an extremely aggressive
and activist role," refusing "to be bound by text or precedent" and frequently
invoking principles "only loosely connected to specific constitutional provisions . . . ."" Despite pretensions to a theory of constitutional interpretation
tied closely to the Framers' original understanding, Rehnquist in fact falls victim to the cardinal sin of the judicial activist - "the erection of a judge's per' 6°
sonal values and opinions into constitutional norms."

Less current, but still an important treatment of Justice Rehnquist, is the
judicial profile published by Harvard law professor, David L. Shapiro in
December 1976.61 The original article was based on cases decided through the
ideas," a leader of the Court's "conservative" bloc, and a "hero to the conservatives" must be in some
sense a conservative.
"Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982).
"d. at 1362, 1363. The characterization is tentative because "it still must be said that at times 'his federalism'
leads Justice Rehnquist to reach 'liberal' results." Id. at 1363. Thus,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins [447 U.S. 74 (1980)] permitted the California Supreme Court
to expand the concept of a public forum for free speech purposes in that state. Moore v. Sims
[442 U.S. 415 (1979)] may have resulted in greater protection for Texas children who are abused
by their parents. If the Court had adopted Rehnquist's position in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
[435 U.S. 151 (1978)], that case would have increased the environmental safety of Washington's
sounds and coasts. Hughes v. Oklahoma [441 U.S. 322 (1979)] invalidated an attempt by Oklahoma
to conserve its wildlife, but only over Rehnquist's protests, just as Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways
Corp. [450 U.S. 662 (1981)] prevented Iowa from protecting its motorists from the danger and
annoyance posed by double-trailer trucks despite Rehnquist's arguments. If the Court had followed
Justice Rehnquist's analysis in First NationalBank v. Bellotti [435 U.S. 765 (1978)], Massachusetts
would have been allowed to take a very reasonable step to ensure that big business and its money
would not drown out other voices in a political controversy. Such decisions suggest that, at least
sometimes, the Justice is willing to follow his federalism principles wherever they may lead.
Id.
"Id. at 1359 (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 1360.
"Id. at 1370. The Powell study is far more than a critique of Justice Rehnquist's judicial activism. It
undertakes a thorough canvass of relevant opinions designed to show how a Jeffersonian theory of
federalism, emphasizing values of state sovereignty and autonomy, "emerges from Justice Rehnquist's
work on the Court," Id. at 1320. As applied, the theory is evident in Rehnquist's efforts to preserve state
legislative freedom of action, his deference to state court jurisdiction, and his readiness to find limits upon
the powers of the national government where it might otherwise encroach upon state autonomy. Powell
finds the theory to be internally consistent and, for the most part, consistently applied, even when it
occasionally leads to liberal substantive results. The theory fails, as "an objective first principle" (id. at
1363), however, because it is at odds with history and the Framers' intent which the Justice so frequently
- but mistakenly - invokes. Id. at 1363-70.
"Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
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1975 Supreme Court term. A subsequent much abbreviated version extended
the case coverage to the close of the 1976 term without necessitating any significant revision in its conclusions.62 Shapiro characterized the Justice as "a man
of considerable intellectual power" whose judicial product had been adversely
affected by "the unyielding character of his ideology." ' 63 The reference to intellect and ideology parallels observations made by others; but, in contrast to
most of the others, Shapiro does not use the word "conservative" at any place
in the 65-page article. 64 Instead, he defines the Rehnquist ideology as embodying the following three propositions:
(1) Conflicts between an individual and the government should,
whenever possible, be resolved against the individual.
(2) Conflicts between state and federal authority, whether on an
executive, legislative or judicial level, should, whenever possible, be resolved
in favor of the states; and
(3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction, whether on the
district court, appellate court or Supreme Court level, should, whenever
possible, be resolved against such exercise.
This approach adds precision to his analysis by substituting propositions of
readily ascertainable content for a label whose meaning may differ from one
context to another. The propositions represent categories empirically derived
from an examination of the cases 66 rather than categories based on political,
economic, or social values that people commonly associate with a conservative
political philosophy. Nevertheless, the analysis does lose something by refusing to identify Rehnquist with an intellectual and political tradition which has
meaning and significance, however ill-defined its contours. Few would deny
that Shapiro's three propositions are more congenial to a modern-day conservative than a liberal viewpoint.
Having identified at the outset the essential elements of the Rehnquist
"ideology," Shapiro devotes the greater part of his analysis to demonstrating
how a rigid adherence to the ideology has substantially reduced the quality of
Justice Rehnquist's judicial product.67 The critique is essentially three-pronged.
"The shortened version appears in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES

AND MAJOR OPINIONS 109 (L. Friedman ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
3

Shapiro, supra note 61, at 293.
"The shortened version uses the term only once, in the introductory paragraph: "But young as he was,
his ideology was clear to his supporters and opponents alike - an ideology that President Richard M.
Nixon, who appointed him, described somewhat imperfectly as that of a 'judicial conservative.' " Friedman,
supra note 62, at 109.
"Shapiro, supra note 61, at 294 (footnotes omitted).
"In Shapiro's words, "A review of all the cases in which Justice Rehnquist has taken part indicates that
his votes are guided by these three basic propositions." Id. at 294.
"'In keeping with his generally negative appraisal of the Rehnquist performance, Shapiro digresses briefly
from his central theme (the harmful impact of ideology on judicial output) in order to criticize the justice
in another context - the failure to practice what he preaches about the importance of ascertaining the
Framers' intent and staying close to the text of the Constitution. To show the gap between theory and
practice, Shapiro discusses three cases in which the justice "appears to have reached his conclusion by
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First, in a number of important areas of constitutional adjudication, ideology
has led Justice Rehnquist to "develop and pursue doctrine which is unsound
and poorly grounded in reason and precedent." 68 This is especially true of his
narrowing interpretations of the equal protection clause, the role of federal
courts in vindicating federal rights, and the reach of procedural due process.
Second, the Justice has frequently sacrificed high standards of judicial craftsmanship out of zeal to implement his ideological commitment. Specifically,
he has avoided reasoned elaboration when careful analysis might lead to an
undesired result;69 he has "ignored important jurisdictional issues" and "made
assertions of facts unsupported by the record"; 7 and he has shown no hesitation in deciding controversial questions not presented or not necessary to the
disposition of the case "when doing so would have precluded full explication
of his ideology."' Finally, according to Shapiro, Justice Rehnquist has
occasionally been less than candid in the use of precedent. Instead of openly
admitting the inconsistency of his result with the result or rationale of a prior
case, he has misrepresented some aspect of the prior case and, in effect, changed
the law "without the acknowledgment that candor would demand." 72 Some
of Shapiro's conclusions, particularly the three propositions characterized as
the Rehnquist "ideology," are capable of empirical demonstration. Most of
the others are matters of judgment and interpretation based upon more or less
ambiguous facts. But even on the judgment calls, Shapiro is at great pains to
identify and describe the relevant decided cases so that readers have a basis
for evaluating his conclusions."
III.

THE ATTRIBUTED PHILOSOPHY: IS REHNQUIST A "CONSERVATIVE"?

Most of the writings examined above, in one way or another, identify
political conservatism as an ideological component of Justice Rehnquist's value
system. Shapiro avoids labels and gives to the Rehnquist ideology an empirical
content derived from the cases, but the affinity of his three propositions with
political conservatism seems apparent enough. The socio-political views
drawing broad, unwarranted inferences from the provisions of the Constitution, by paying little or no
attention to the intent of the framers, or both." Shapiro, supranote 61, at 302. The cases are: Richardson
v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"Shapiro, supra note 61, at 307.
"E.g., "One is left with the indelible impression [referring to Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)]
that Justice Rehnquist sacrificed reasoned analysis to his determination that the conviction for mailing
obscene and manifestly distasteful materials be affirmed." Id. at 332.
"Id. at 334.
"Id. at 341-42.
"Id. at 350.
"For a contrasting viewpoint, differing markedly from Shapiro in style and emphasis, see Anderson, The
Jurisprudenceof Justice Rehnquist: Government by Constitution and Consensus, 17 INTERCOLLEGIATE
REV. 17 (1981). Anderson presents a gracefully written distillation of Justice Rehnquist's views on
constitutional interpretation, focussing primarily on his equal protection opinions and his ideas about
the democratic basis of constitutional government. Anderson sees "government by consensus" as the central
value of the Rehnquist philosophy, with the Constitution serving as "the fundamental consensus upon
which all legislative and executive actions and policies, themselves the beings of consensus, must depend."
Id. at 26. This is a sympathetic interpretive essay, leaning primarily to exposition rather than critique.
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attributed to Justice Rehnquist include such values as respect for private property, willingness to limit individual rights in conflict with government authority,
a preference for societal interests over the rights of the criminally accused, and
great deference to the principle of state autonomy. These positions fall well
commonly associated with political conservatism
within the range of preferences
74
in American society.
Whether political ideology has any place in judicial decision making is
another question. Ideology speaks to results or outcomes, not to legal principles or process. Arguably, it is an illegitimate if not irrelevant influence upon
judicial behavior. Indeed, it woulid be irrelevant if decisions always were
grounded in "neutral" constitutional principles, i.e., "reasons that in their
75
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved."
But most of the writings on Justice Rehnquist have assumed that judges do
not live by neutral principles alone and have been quite willing to find ideological
motivations in his judicial decision making. At the very least, the term may
appropriately describe the product if not the motivation for his judicial decisions.
If there is fair consensus that Justice Rehnquist's result-oriented values
reflect political conservatism, there is less consensus on his status as a "judicial
conservative," a concept more strictly related to constitutional adjudication
in its narrow definition. As identified in the writings about Rehnquist, the
elements of judicial conservatism (sometimes called judicial restraint) include:
(1) deference to legislative determinations, (2) deciding cases on the narrowest
possible grounds, including the avoidance of constitutional decisions when possible, (3) respect for precedent, and (4) concern that decisions be grounded in
76
textual provisions of the Constitution. Fiss and Krauthammer, Soifer, and
"According to the leading dictionary of American public affairs the "conservative position on issues"
in American politics
has been fairly consistently opposed to governmental regulation of the economy, heavy government
spending, and civil rights legislation. Conservatives tend to favor state over federal action, fiscal
responsibility, decreased governmental spending, supply-side economics, the outlawing of abortion,
more effective crime control, and lower taxes.
J. PLANO & M. GREENBERG, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 6 (6th ed. 1982).
Spaeth's study of the Supreme Court describes the Liberal-Conservative dichotomy in comparable terms:
Liberals support the exercise of civil liberties and an expansion of the rights of persons accused
of crime; they also support the demise of racial, social, and political discrimination, and improvement
of the economic status of the poor. Liberals also support New Deal economics; that is, they are
pro-union, antibusiness, and procompetition, and they favor compensation for injured persons.
Spaeth, supra note 33, at 133-34. Spaeth posits three dimensions of a Liberal-Conservative continuum
which he labels "freedom," "equality," and "New Dealism." Of eighteen justices serving on the United
States Supreme Court, 1958-1977, Justice Rehnquist is ranked as the most extreme conservative on the
freedom and equality dimensions and second only to Justice Harlan on the conservative end of the "New
Deal" dimension. The ratings are based on Spaeth's appraisal of voting on decided cases. Id. at 135.
75H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES. POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27 (1961). Although Wechsler was first to
expound the concept of "neutral principles," the term is widely associated with its subsequent elaboration
in Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
"See Fiss & Krauthammer, supra note 49, at 19-20; Lind, supra note 39, at 102-08; Riemenschneider,
supra note 35, at 230-34; Rydell, supra note 25, at 908-15. For an extensive discussion of the meaning
of judicial restraint see Lamb, Judicial Restraint on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM
AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Lamb]. According to Lamb the term
embodies at least six fundamental notions: 1. that the justices abide by the intent of the framers
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Shapiro regard him as more in the judicial activist mold, not highly respectful
of precedent and inclined to reach out beyond the necessary holding in a case
to decide or make pronouncements on matters to which he is ideologically committed. They find him very deferential to state legislatures but less so to the
United States Congress. They recognize that he often grounds decisions in the

text of the Constitution, but find that he is willing to ignore the need for specific
constitutional moorings in particular cases. Rydell, on the other hand, while
recognizing the willingness to overturn precedent, is inclined nevertheless to
ascribe a philosophy of judicial conservatism to Justice Rehnquist. Lind also
emphasizes the strong element of textualism in Justice Rehnquist's opinions,
except in first amendment cases, and the consistent deference to state govern-

ments, a position consistent with a philosophy of judicial restraint.
IV.

THE SELF-ARTICULATED PHILOSOPHY

Justice Rehnquist has been unusually explicit in articulating his own ideas
about constitutional interpretation, and his views have much in common with
generally accepted notions of judicial restraint. But, initially at least, his
philosophy ought to be examined on its own terms. If we look at his judicial
opinions" and published addresses7 8, the principal source materials for the selfarticulated philosophy, three dominant themes emerge. First, the Constitution
is a governmental charter which prescribes a distinctive federal structure,
distributes certain powers among the various parts of the structure, and places
important limitations upon the exercise of governmental powers. Second, the
foundation principle of that government is majority rule, with all ultimate
political authority vested in the people, by whose authority the Constitution
was originally established. Third, the judicial review function can be performed
consistently with the democratic concept of government only if the Court
objectively interprets the Constitution according to the framers' intent as derived
from the constitutional text, the historical record, and necessary implications
of the Constitution and statutes, and that the justices not read their own personal preferences into
the law; 2. that the justices pay deference to the legislative and executive branches of the federal
and state governments by seldom overruling their policies, and then only on strictly "legal" grounds;
3. that the justices rely upon statutory rather than constitutional construction wherever possible;
4. that the justices accept for decision only "cases and controversies" where the litigants have standing
to sue in live issues; and 5. that the justices neither issue advisory opinions nor 6. answer political
questions.
Lamb, supra, at 8. And for a review of the literature on judicial activism and restraint, see Lamb & Lustig,
The Burger Court, ExclusionaryZoning, and the Activist-RestraintDebate, 40 U. PiTr. L. REV. 169 (1979).
"Elaboration of his personal philosophy has, for understandable reasons, been more common in his dissents
than in opinions written for the Court. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 432 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
"Rehnquist, Act Well Your Part, Therein All Honor Lies, 9 HUM. RTs. 42 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Act Well Your Part]; Rehnquist, Government by Cliche, 45 Mo. L. REV. 379 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Government by Cliche]; Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Living Constitution]; Rehnquist, PoliticalBattles for JudicialIndependence, 50 WASH.
L. REV. 835 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PoliticalBattles].
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from the constitutional plan. This section will discuss each of these themes under
separate headings.
A. The Constitution as Government Charter
For Justice Rehnquist the notion of the Constitution as a "fundamental
charter" 7 9 is closely identified with the structure of the government created by
the Constitution and the distribution of powers among its various entities. His
perception of the intended distribution is closely wedded to views expressed
by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison"° and is perhaps the central element
of his philosophy of constitutional adjudication. Most fundamentally, the
various organs of government possess authority only to the extent that it was
"parceled out" to them by the adoption of the Constitution and its subsequent
amendments.8 ' Justic Rehnquist describes that distribution in quite prosaic terms:
They [the people] have granted some authority to the federal government
and have reserved authority not granted it to the states or to the people
individually. As between the branches of the federal government, the people
have given certain authority to the President, certain authority to the Congress, and certain authority to the federal judiciary. In the Bill of Rights
they have erected protections for specified individual rights against the
actions of the federal government. From today's perspective we might
add that they have placed restrictions on the authority of the state governments in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.8 2
This structural analysis of the Constitution is not unique to Justice Rehnquist, even in modern times, 3 and the use of structural implications in the Constitution to decide lawsuits traces its roots at least back to McCulloch v.
Maryland.84 But among current members of the Supreme Court, he is clearly
"Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 697; Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 381.
"U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
"Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696; Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 381.
"Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696.
"For example, Professor Ely claims that the Constitution, as a government charter, is overwhelmingly
concerned with process and structure, and not with specific substantive values. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 92 (1980). Most of the amendments also deal with such structural and procedural matters as
the franchise, executive and judicial procedures, and the structure and limitation of the branches of
government. Id. at 92-99. Indeed, according to Professor Ely, prescribing the processes and structures
of government is the proper function of a Constitution. Id. at 101.
Professor Charles L. Black also advocates constitutional interpretation through inferences drawn from
governmental structure (though his inferences are much broader than Justice Rehnquist would be inclined
to draw, e.g., Professor Black would infer from the structure evident in the Constitution the necessity
to apply the Bill of Rights to the states, even without the fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist would
not feel compelled to draw such an inference). C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP INCONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 39 (1969).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The first part of the opinion addresses the question whether Congress
could create national banks. Although this part of the opinion is sometimes treated as resting on the
"necessary and proper" clause, a more careful reading shows that Marshall decided the case on the basis
of more general implications from the Constitution. He discussed the necessary and proper clause only
in response to counsel's argument regarding its restrictive force. The second part of the opinion addresses
the question whether a state can tax the national bank. Although Marshall's opinion may seem to some
to rest on the Supremacy Clause of article VI, the opinion is essentially a structural analysis. Article VI
merely declares the supremacy of whatever the national law may be and does not give content to the law.
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the most prone to use structural considerations as a basis for judicial decision
and to justify this position as consistent with past precedent. "[The] Court,"
he contends, "has often relied on notions of a constitutional plan - the implicit
ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make the Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each provision the full effect
intended by the Framers." 5 Moreover, this "implicit ordering" is apparently
an adequate substitute for explicit constitutional text: "The tacit postulates
yielded by that ordering are as much engrained in the fabric of the document
as its express provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied force
and often meaning." ' "1Indeed, "there can be no more fundamental constitutional question than that of the intention of the Framers of the Constitution
as to how authority should be allocated between the National and State
Governments." 87
Although Justice Rehnquist has not systematically spelled out all of the
legal implications arising from the structure of the Constitution, his concept
of structure emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty in the original scheme
of things. In dissenting from a Supreme Court decision upholding a federal
law temporarily freezing the wages of state employees, he laid great stress upon
the law's undue interference with "the State's performance of its sovereign
functions of government."8 8 As he perceived constitutional history, "the States
as such were regarded by the Framers of the Constitution as partaking of many
"8...9 This was particularly evident in the tenth
attributes of sovereignty .
which
are prime
and eleventh amendments,
examples of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although
their legislative authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas
where Congress was competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free
to deal with a State as if it were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation."'
Undoubtedly the most striking application of Justice Rehnquist's structural analysis as a bulwark of state sovereignty is NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery,9 which invalidated a federal law extending minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to state and local governmental employees. Speaking
for the Court, he found that such an "exercise of congressional authority does
"Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433-34 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As authority for this statement
he cites McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and his own opinion in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Id.
"Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 556 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946)
(Stone, C.J., concurring)).
"Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'OId. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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not comport with the federal system of government embodied in the
Constitution." 9 2 The doctrine of structural limitations implicit in the constitutional ordering of relationships was not as fully developed in NationalLeague
of Cities as in his earlier dissent in Fry v. United States,93 but the same rationale
is there. As in the Fry dissent, he alluded to the tenth amendment as an affirmative limitation upon the exercise of Congressional power vis a vis the states,94
but the weight of the analysis obviously rested upon his conception of the
framer's understanding of the proper ordering of relationships between the central government and the states, rather than the explicit terms of the amendment."
The same principle of state autonomy, derived from the "implicit ordering of relationships," also protects the states from one another's encroachment. This view was made clear in his dissent from the Court's decision in
Nevada v. Hall,9 6 which permitted the state of Nevada to be sued in the courts
of California. By a literal reading of the constitutional text, the Court concluded that the eleventh amendment foreclosed only federal court jurisdiction
of unconsenting state defendants; hence a state could be made a defendant
in the courts of other states. In a strong dissent to this anomalous but textually
plausible interpretation of the amendment, Justice Rehnquist took occasion
to elaborate his concept of the "constitutional plan" which underlies and gives
meaning to the express provisions of the Constitution.97 His exploration of "the
understanding of the Framers and the consequent doctrinal evolution of concepts of state sovereignty" 98 led him to the conclusion that the Court's decision in the present case could not possibly be correct.
[T]he States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions, for, as Mr. Justice Blackmun notes, they
would have otherwise perversely foreclosed the neutral federal forums only
to be left to defend suits in the courts of other States. The Eleventh Amendment is thus built on the postulate that States are not, absent their consent, amenable to suit in the courts of sister States. 99
The constitutional plan as he saw it accorded a high degree of sovereign
separateness to the states not only in their relationships with the national govern"Id. at 852.
3421 U.S. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nor was the doctrine as explicit as the analysis in Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 432 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Undoubtedly he feels freer to adumbrate
his own philosophy in dissents than in opinions which must command the support of a majority.
"National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43.
"The point had already been made explicit in his Fry dissent where he noted that "the Tenth Amendment
by its terms" did not prohibit "congressional action which sets a mandatory ceiling on the wages of all
state employees," but insisted that such a limitation nevertheless inhered in "the understanding of those
who drafted and ratified the Constitution..." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
96440 U.S. 410 (1979).

"Id. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 434 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ment but also in their relationships with other states.
In theory, and occasionally in practice, the Justice has recognized that
"the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments ...sharply altered
the balance of power between the Federal and State governments."' 0 ° In
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 10 ' for example, Justice Rehnquist held that the eleventh
amendment did not bar an award of retroactive damages against a state for
employment discrimination violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
He concluded that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 0 Nevertheless, he has argued
that the core prohibitions of the equal protection clause are aimed at discrimination based on race and national origin'0 3 and that all other classifications are
to be judged by the "rational basis" standard.'0 4 The application of strict judicial
scrutiny to other "suspect classifications" or to classifications involving "fundamental rights" simply has no place in constitutional adjudication because it
cannot be justified from the intent of those who adopted the fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist thus recognizes the existence of limits on state sovereignty imposed by the Civil War amendments but construes the limits narrowly.
The concept of the Constitution as "government Charter" is not exhausted
with the analysis of relationships among the states and between the states and
the federal government. The constitutional allocation of powers was also intended to create a balance between two important and complementary principles: order and liberty.' 05 Because of its emphasis on balance, the Constitution is not correctly described as "a charter which guarantees rights to individuals
against the government."'0 Rather it creates, in the words of Justice Cardozo,
"a scheme of ordered liberty."' 0 7 This means, says Justice Rehnquist, "Not
order at the expense of liberty, and not liberty at the expense of order, but
as large a measure of each as may be had without sacrificing the other ... ". 1 0
The Bill of Rights, of course, was drafted "as a bulwark of individual freedom
'"Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In this case the reference to
the Civil War amendments affected only the theory and not the practice, since his dissent would have
upheld an Illinois probate law that discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy. For a similar admission
of the limiting effect of the amendments, see Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696.
"427 U.S. 445 (1976).
"'Id. at 456.
"'Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 780 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
"'In Trimble, Justice Rehnquist explained that classifications based on alienage have been considered
"suspect" by the Court because "they are enough like [race and national origin classifications] to warrant
similar treatment." 430 U.S. at 780 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). However, he dissented in Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), because he felt that there was no historical indication that the framers of
the fourteenth amendment intended to render alienage a suspect classification or to protect "discrete and
insular minorities" other than racial minorities. 413 U.S. at 650 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"'This aspect of the "constitutional plan" is most fully elaborated in a public address delivered in 1980
at the University of Missouri Law School. Government by Cliche, supra note 78, passim.
101d. at 381.
"'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
"Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 386.
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against government tyranny," but "it is a gross mischaracterization to describe
the entire Constitution in these terms. The original Constitution was adopted
not to enshrine states' rights or to guarantee individualfreedom, but to create
a limited national government which was empowered to curtail both states'
rights and individual freedom."" 9
In most of this analysis Justice Rehnquist speaks of a "balance" between
order and liberty, but, in context, his argument is intended to provide a counterweight to (he says to "debunk") 10 the popular notion that the Constitution
exists primarily to protect individual liberties against government intrusion.
While decrying the notion that the balance should be tilted in favor either of
individual rights or of governmental authority,"' his opinions frequently reflect
a very high value placed upon order and governmental authority. A typical
example is Roberts v. Louisiana' 2 in which the Court struck down a Louisiana
statute that prescribed a mandatory death sentence for intentional murder of
a police officer. The Court found that the failure of the statute to allow consideration of mitigating circumstances was a violation of the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. In dissent, he perceived
in the case "large questions of ... how liberty and order should be balanced
in a civilized society." "I1 Policemen, he argued, as the "foot soldiers of society's
defense of ordered liberty," should have a special claim on the state's protection. The premeditated murder of a peace office is such a threat to order that
no mitigating circumstances whatever could counterbalance the interest in the
protection of society. "It is no service to individual rights, or to individual
liberty, to undermine what is surely the fundamental right and responsibility
the maintenance of order so that all may enjoy
of any civilized government:
4
liberty and security."" 1
Justice Rehnquist has made a somewhat similar analysis of the first amendment, contrasting what he terms the "individualist" and the "utilitarian"
theories of free speech. The individualist theory justifies the right to speak and
°1Id. at 387 (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 381.
"'Justice Rehnquist observed:
The Supreme Court of the United States, in deciding a case in which individual rights are pitted
against the claim of the national government or of state governments to regulate individual conduct,
"upholds" the Constitution by simply holding the balance true to the best of its ability. To suggest
that it should "tilt" that balance in favor of individual rights, or in favor of governmental authority,
breaches faith with the assumptions upon which the Constitution was adopted and upon which
the Supreme Court has to the best of its ability operated for nearly two centuries. It is no more
accurate to say of our Court that it is the ultimate guardian of individual rights than it is to say
that it is the ultimate guardian of national authority or states' rights. Its function is to decide among
these conflicting claims as truly and accurately as it can in accordance with a fundamental charter
and later amendments which have been adopted by the source of all governmental authority the people of this country.
Id. at 392-93 (emphasis in original).
431 U.S. 633 (1977).

"3Id. at 643 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 647 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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publish as an end in itself because it "is essential to the individual's integrity
and to his claim to be master of his own personal development."' 15 The
utilitarian theory, on the other hand, would justify free speech
not by any inherent entitlement in the individual, but rather by the good
results which accrue to society at large from recognizing such an entitlement in the individual. Implicit in that criterion is the idea that expression
need not be tolerated where it makes no useful contribution to society,
or where the contribution which it makes is outweighed by the possible
harms which it may bring about."I6
Although Justice Rehnquist does not explicitly commit himself to either theory,
his leaning toward the utilitarian approach is apparent." 7 Just as the Constitution
as a whole prescribes a balance between liberty and order, the utilitarian view
of the first amendment balances society's interest in controlling speech against
the contribution of the speech to informed political judgment or, in a broader
utilitarian view, its contribution to the general marketplace of ideas." 8
Thus, the Constitution is more than a "charter of liberty" or a "bulwark
of individual rights." These phrases partly describe it, to be sure. But it is also
a charter creating a government with sufficient power allocated among its various
branches to maintain order and with sufficient restrictions upon the power of
the federal government to preserve a fair amount of state autonomy.
B. Majority Rule
The foundation principle underlying the constitutional charter is government by the people. As explained by Justice Rehnquist, the concept is not particularly complicated. It simply means, "[tihe people are the ultimate source
of authority; they have parceled out the authority that originally resided entirely
with them by adopting the original Constitution and later amending it." " 9 But
however simple in expression, the concept is of profound significance. The
preambular reference to "We the People" reaches to the very heart of the Constitution. It reflects the fundamental notion of popular sovereignty which is
the essence of the governmental system the document was intended to establish.
The Constitution is the highest law of the land only because the people have
willed it so.
"'Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
Justice Rehnquist borrowed these concepts from Emerson, Justice Douglas' Contribution to the Law:
The First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 353 (1974).
"'Rehnquist, supra note 109, at 7.
"7Id. In an earlier address utilizing the same concepts his preference for the utilitarian approach is more
obvious. See Rehnquist, Civility and Freedom of Speech, 49 IND. L.J. 1 (1973).
"'Rehnquist, Civility and Freedom of Speech, 49 IND. L.J. 1, 4-7 (1973). Lind, commenting on the
Rehnquist first amendment philosophy, carries the argument one step farther: "Since societal benefit provides
the basis for an individual's rights, the government interest, represting that of society, will generally take
precedence." Lind, supra note 38, at 109. The Rehnquist analysis does not go this far, but his voting
record on first amendment questions suggests that this may be the operative result of his philosophy.
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696. Rehnquist relies heavily on John Marshall's exposition of
the concept in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See, id.; Government by Cliche, supra
note 78, at 389.
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The system thus established "may loosely be called 'majority rule'."' 2
The Constitution itself prescribes what majorities are required to decide what
kinds of issues, including the extraordinary majorities needed to approve the
Constitution and to change it by amendment. This emphasis upon majority
rule in constitutional change is very important to Justice Rehnquists view of
the proper function of judicial review, which is considered in the next section
of the paper. The infrequency of constitutional amendment might be cited as
evidence of the need for judicial construction as a vehicle of constitutional
change.2IFor Rehnquist, however, the experience of ratifying twenty-six amendments indicates that the system is workable, i.e., "when the Nation sees the
need for a change, it is willing to alter the fundamental charter of
government."' 22 The requirement of extraordinary majorities makes amendment more difficult, but that expresses the will of the sovereign people that
fundamental constitutional principles should not easily be changed, not even
by themselves. As Justice Rehnquist expressed it, "A mere change in public
opinion since the adoption of the Constitution, unaccompanied by a constitutional amendment, should not change the meaning of the Constitution. A merely
temporary majoritarian groundswell should not abrogate some individual liberty
truly protected by the Constitution.""'
His concept of popular sovereignty is also heavy with moral implications.
While fundamentally a charter of government, the Constitution also incorporates
substantive values, such as freedom of expression and political equality,124 which
were of special importance to the Framers. The inherent nature of these values
is less important than the fact of their inclusion in the document, however,
because they derive their claim to judicial protection not from any intrinsic
"moral rightness" but from their adoption by the people as part of the fundamental charter. The Bill of Rights, for example, embodies guarantees of individual freedom against action by the federal and state governments. The importance of these guarantees has been vastly expanded by the judiciary in recent
decades. But if a constitutional majority were to succeed in repealing the first
ten amendments, there would be nothing in the Constitution or its underlying
"'Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 384.
"'See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 83, at 46 n.115.
'Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 387.
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696-97.
'"U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend XIV. Even these amendments, according to Professor Ely,
may be better explained in terms of structure and process than in terms of substantive values. See. J.
ELY, supra note 83, at 93-94, 98 (1980). Similarly, in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S.
60, 73-74 (1978), Justice Rehnquist responded to appellants' claim that alternative forms of municipal
administration would be more "practical" than Alabama's by reference to the principle of popular
sovereignty:
From a political science standpoint, appellants' suggestions may be sound, but this Court does
not sit to determine whether Alabama has chosen the soundest or most practical form of internal
government possible. Authority to make those judgments resides in the state legislature, and Alabama
citizens are free to urge their proposals to that body.
Id. See also, Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 704.
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philosophy to "make this an illegal, an immoral, or an improper act.", 2 5 "It
might well be an unwise one, but in a system based on 'government of the
people, by the people, and for the people,' there is no appeal to any higher
forum or court than a forum which properly and accurately reflects their will."' 26
This rather startling assertion illustrates the essential difference between "a
system based on majority rule" and one arising from a "more elitist or
philosophical notion of 'natural law' or 'government by the judiciary .... ' "127
Justice Rehnquist thus rejects natural law, "fundamental rights," and every
other standard of politically or judicially enforceable moral rightness independent of the Constitution. Only the sovereign - the people - can confer
legitimacy upon rights, liberties, and laws, at least to the extent that such values
are judicially cognizable. This is true not only of constitutional principles, but
also of enacted laws, which "take on a form of moral goodness because they
have been enacted into positive law.""'2 On this point he is insistent: "It is
the fact of their enactment that gives them whatever moral claim they have
upon us as a society . . . and not any independent virtue they may have in
any particular citizen's own scale of value."' 2 9
Justice Rehnquist, of course, recognizes that moral values derived from
other sources create imperatives for individual citizens. He does not assert that
all morality inheres in majority judgments. Neither the relatively permanent
judgments embodied in the Constitution nor the somewhat more transient
judgments produced by the shifting popular majorities in national, state, and
local legislative bodies have such a monopoly of virtue. Quite the contrary,
"individual moral judgments . . . are without doubt the most common and
most powerful wellsprings for action when one believes that questions of right
and wrong are involved."' 3 But values held by an individual, or even by many
individuals, have no claim upon the society as a whole until they have been
embodied in legislative enactment or constitutional amendment. To this principle to Justice is fully committed: "I know of no other method compatible
with political theory basic to democratic society by which one's own conscientious belief may be translated into positive law and thereby obtain the only
3
general moral imprimatur permissible in a pluralistic, democratic society."' '
The "majority rule" principle has one obvious implication for judicial
decision-making: courts should defer to the decisions of legislatures as the current
" Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 391.
"'Id.
at 390-91.
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 704.
"'Id.For a biting attack on this position as "moral relativism," see Justice, supra note 44, at 19. The
critique by Judge William Justice is accurate in the sense that laws (and the Constitution) may be changed
and consequently work a change in the substance of the rules having "moral claim... upon us as a society."
Id. at 27. The critique may be a little unfair, however, in some of the more extreme implications it draws.
'"Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 705.
1'Id.
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voice of the people except when the legislation clearly runs afoul of a constitutional provision (or perhaps some principle implicit in the "constitutional plan").
The philosophy of deference to majority rule is explicit in Justice Rehnquist's
opinions dealing with both state and federal legislation, particularly in cases
involving an equal protection challenge. A recent illustration of his deference
to congressional enactments is RailroadRetirement Board v. Fritz,1 2 in which
he wrote for the Court upholding a section of the Railroad Retirement Act
of 1974 that reduced potential benefits for some members of the system. In
a typical Rehnquist equal protection analysis, he observed, "Where, as here,
there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end."' 3 3
Inevitably, when people are classified for benefits, " 'some persons who have
an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment [will] be placed on different sides of the line' . . . and the fact that the line might have been drawn
points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,
differently at some
34
consideration.'
More often, principles of deferential scrutiny are enunciated in cases relating
to decisions of state and local bodies. For example, his dissent in Furman v.
Georgia'3 (which invalidated the Georgia death penalty as cruel and unusual
punishment) leaned heavily on the majority rule rationale: "The Court's
judgments today strike down a penalty that our Nation's legislators have thought
necessary since our country was founded."' 3 6 While admitting that "overreaching by the legislative and executive branches may result in the sacrifice
of individual protections that the Constitution was designed to secure against
action of the State," he insisted that the "judicial overreaching" evident in
this decision sacrificed "the equally important right of the people to govern
themselves." ' ' 37 His dissent in Trimble v. Gordon3 ' provides another exposition of the same theme in the context of a 5-4 decision invalidating an Illinois
law barring intestate inheritance by illegitimate children from their fathers. Policy
decisions, the Justice said, are to be made by the people through their elected
representatives, and not by judges. The Court has no warrant to second guess
legislative decisions or to judge the wisdom or adequacy of the measures enacted
by the majority. The "Constitutional Convention in 1787 rejected the idea that
members of the federal judiciary should sit on a council of revision and veto
laws which it considered unwise," ,39 and the "Civil War Amendments" did

not reverse that decision.

140

'32449 U.S. 166 (1980).
13Id.
at 179.
1'3Id. at 179 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1976)).
"1408 U.S. 238 (1972).
131Id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17Id.
at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'3430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977).
'"Id. at 778 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
l'Id.(Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). The proposition that policy judgments are for legislatures, not the courts,
is a theme often repeated in his opinions. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). "Neither
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Justice Rehnquist's attitude of deference to state legislatures undoubtedly
shows through most strongly in his application of the "rational basis" test in
equal protection cases such as Trimble v. Gordon.'" By 1976 this tendency
had already become so pronounced that Shapiro felt justified in saying Justice
Rehnquist was using the rational basis test as "a label to describe a preordained
result."" 2 However characterized, the equal protection cases clearly reflect
Justice Rehnquist's allegiance to sovereignty of the people, exercised through
"majority rule," as the foundation principle of the Constitution. Many people
have found the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment explicit
enough to justify a broad range of restrictions on legislatures, but Justice Rehnquist has been unwilling to give it that effect. He finds in the history of the
amendment no intent to invalidate state enactments for any reason other than
invidious discrimination on the basis of race or similar irrelevant and irrational
criteria. I,"
The sovereign will of the people, as expressed through their legislative
decisions, must be honored unless necessary to prevent the discrimination which
the people sought to remedy in ratifying the fourteenth amendment. So long
as the legislative judgment is not completely arbitrary or irrational, and the
type of invidious discrimination targeted by the amendment does not exist, the
Court should not second guess the legislature. Justice Rehnquist has never voted
to invalidate a statute after applying the rational basis test, partly because state
legislatures, made up of men and women at least clever enough to get themselves
elected by popular vote, generally do not make their decisions arbitrarily and
irrationally."'
this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to weigh the policy arguments
in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles .
Id. at 248. In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24 (1974) Rehnquist stated:
Pressed upon us by respondents, and by amici curiae, are contentions that these notions are
outmoded, and that the more modern view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating
the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has
completed the serving of his term. We would by no means discount these arguments if addressed
to the legislative forum which may properly weigh and balance them against those advanced in
support of California's present constitutional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one set of
values over the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the
more enlightened and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately
come around to that point of view. And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at
least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument.
Id. at 55.
'"He first articulated his view of the rational basis standard in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972), where he observed that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires neither that state enactments be 'logical' nor does it require that they be 'just' in the common
meaning of those terms. It requires only that there be some conceivable set of facts that may justify the
classification involved." Id. at 183 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For other examples of his deferential equal
protection analysis, see Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2323 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662,
687 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 545 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
But see Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982).
" Shapiro, supra note 40, at 308.
"'see, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 779-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'"Justice Rehnquist did suggest in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
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Justice Rehnquist's propensity to defer to legislative judgment, then, is
grounded in his concept of the sovereignty of the people in the constitutional
scheme. Since it is inevitable that the Court will occasionally err, it is better
to err in sustaining a state law than in invalidating it. This is true because
[an error in mistakenly sustaining the constitutionality of a particular
enactment, while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right secured
to him by the Constitution, nonetheless does so by simply letting stand
a duly enacted law of a democratically chosen legislative body. The error
resulting from a mistaken upholding of an individual's constitutional claim
against the validity of a legislative enactment is a good deal more serious.
For the result in such a case is not to leave standing a law duly enacted
by a representative assembly, but to impose upon the Nation the judicial
of judges whose connection with the popular
fiat of a majority of a court
145
will is remote at best.
C. The Function of JudicialReview
Justice Rehnquist's vision of the judicial review function may be better
understood if examined with reference to three persisting issues which have
troubled the Court almost from the beginning. The first issue is the legitimacy
of judicial review itself. From Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
4 7 to the HandMadison'46 and Justice Gibson's dissent in Eakins v. Raub"
Wechsler debate'"4 in the mid-twentieth century, commentators have disagreed
whether the Constitution grants any authority to the judicial branch to review
the constitutional judgments of its coordinate branches. 9 As a practical matter
the issue has long since been resolved in favor of judicial review, although
challenges to the Supreme Court as the exclusive and ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution continue to be raised. 50 Justice Rehnquist's views on this issue
that a statute prohibiting an abortion even if the mother's life were in danger would be sufficiently irrational
to be invalid. Needless to say, such a law did not exist in the statutes of any state.
'4'Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 468 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1465 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
"'12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
"'4Judge Learned Hand insisted that the Constitution did not give the courts authority to review the decisions
of Congress, and indeed that such authority was inconsistent with separation of powers. He found
justification for the Supreme Court's assumption of judicial review only in the practical need to keep
the new government from foundering. As a result the power should be exercised only when absolutely
necessary. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958). Professor Wechsler replied that the power of judicial
review is grounded in the article VI Supremacy Clause and in article 1II. Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
"'Most of the debate has centered around the Court's power to review the actions of a coordinate branch
of the federal government. The capacity of the Court to invalidate state legislative decisions, a power
early recognized in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), has beei much less
controverted. As one commentator has stated, "[T]here is nothing in our entire governmental structure
which has a more leak-proof claim to legitimacy than the function of the courts in reviewing state acts
for federal unconstitutionality." C. BLACK, supra note 83, at 74 (1969). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-13 (1978).
' "See, e.g., Gunther, JudicialHegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment
Process, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 30 (1974). Perhaps the most expansive statement by the modern Court in
support of its own authority for judicial review is found in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1959), a case
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will be briefly examined below because they shed light on his attitude toward
the proper scope and conduct of judicial review.
The second issue is the alleged conflict between judicial review and the
concept of majority rule. This issue raises the question whether the power of
non-elected judges to review and invalidate popularly enacted legislation is consistent with our democratic system of government. It also has generated a fair
amount of debate in recent years' 5 ' and is closely related to the issue of
legitimacy. If judicial review is undemocratic and undercuts popular responsibility, it is inconsistent with the fundamental constitutional principle of
majority rule. Could those who framed and ratified the Constitution have
intended such an inconsistency?' 52 On the other hand, the Constitution contains a number of obvious checks on the power of transient majorities, including
the long, staggered terms of Senators, the indirect election of President and
Senate, and the oft noted system of checks and balances embodied in the separation of powers.' 5 3 Judicial review could therefore be seen as another bulwark
against the tyranny of the majority, and quite consistent with the overall constitutional plan.
The third issue centers on the proper standards of judicial review. Must
judges look to the explicit (or at least clearly implicit) values embodied in the
Constitution? Or may they go beyond the language and substance of the Constitution to find guidance in such sources as natural law, "general principles
' 55
of law and reason,""'5 values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"'
5
6
"evolving standards of decency"' and "basic national ideals of individual
liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed
57
as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution"?'
Justice Rehnquist's positions on these three issues form a consistent theory
of judicial review. In brief, he believes that judicial review is legitimate, as long
arising out of the attempt by Arkansas governor Orval Faubus to block implementation of a desegregation
plan for Little Rock public schools.
'See, e.g., JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT (L. Levy ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL
(Levy ed.)]. For statements of the view that judicial review is undemocratic, see Commager,
JudicialReview and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW (Levy ed.); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, in JUDICIAL REVIEW (Levy ed.). For defenses of the democratic
REVIEW

nature of judicial review, see C.

BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY

(1960); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCEss 4-10 (1980); J. ELY. supra note
83, at 73-104; Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, in JUDICIAL REVIEW (Levy ed.).
"'See Commager, supra note 151, at 64; Thayer, supra note 151.
"'1C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 156-64 (1935); see also, THE FEDERALIST,
Nos. 47, 48, 49 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
"'Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
"'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
"'Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1968).
"'Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1975). Some writers have
contended that "higher law" concepts are in fact implicit in the Constitution. See Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-29); Grey, supra,
at 703; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
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as the Court confines itself to the language and intent of the Constitution. To
that extent it is also democratic, for in preferring the terms of the Constitution
over a legislative enactment, the Court is merely giving effect to the highest
expression of the people's will. Thus, judicial review is both legitimate and
democratic, so long as the standard of that review reflects the true meaning
of the Constitution. Each of these positions will be elaborated in the following
discussion.
1. Legitimacy of Judicial Review
Justice Rehnquist's justification for judicial review is borrowed directly
from the John Marshall rationale in Marbury v. Madison.'58 As restated in
his University of Texas address, that rationale recognizes the people as the
"ultimate source of authority in this Nation." 159 The people have conferred
power upon the various governmental entities subject to specified limitations
and a reservation of residual powers to themselves. As long as:
the popular branches of government - state legislatures, the Congress,
and the Presidency - are operating within the authority granted to them
by the Constitution, their judgment and not that of the Court must
obviously prevail. When these branches overstep the authority granted
to them by the Constitution, in the case of the President and the Congress, or invade protected individual rights, and a constitutional challenge
to their action is raised in a lawsuit brought in federal court, the Court
must prefer the Constitution to the government acts.16
In another address, Justice Rehnquist quoted directly from the Marshall opinion
in making a similar point:
The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers
is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are
imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation.
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the constitution by an ordinary act. 6 '
In sum, the Court is to decide controversies according to law. Since the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, it must take precedence over any
other laws, including congressional enactments. Not only is the Court permitted
such review, but, in light of its oath to uphold the Constitution, it must review
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Justice Rehnquist refers to the rationale of this opinion in all his addresses
...
on this topic. See, e.g., Act Well Your Part, supra note 78, at 47; Government by Cliche, supra note
78, at 389; Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696; PoliticalBattles, supra note 78, at 835. It also
appears in his opinions, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696.
"'Id.Presumably the same rationale would apply to judicial review of state acts, although Marbury v.
Madison was concerned with an act of Congress.
"'Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 389 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
176-77 (1803)).
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the constitutionality of legislative enactments in order to give effect to the limitations on governmental power ordained by the people.
2. The Democratic Nature of Judicial Review
That brief summation of the Marshall-Rehnquist rationale for judicial
review provides the core of the argument that judicial review need not conflict
with the principle of majority rule. Judicial review is consistent with democratic
theory because courts are merely carrying out the will of the people when they
declare unconstitutional an Act of Congress or a law passed by a state legislature
which violates that Constitution.' 62 The people truly established a republican
government based on majority rule, but they also recognized the dangers of
a potentially tyrannical majority. Hence they placed in the Bill of Rights, and
elsewhere in the Constitution, certain safeguards and constraints on the rule
of the majority. These constraints, though enforced by the courts through the
process of judicial review, have been imposed by the people. Thus the judges
do not restrain the people (or, more commonly, their chosen representatives);
rather, the Constitutiondoes. Since the Constitution was ordained by the people,
the people are ultimately restraining themselves by institutionalized checks upon
the excesses of temporary majorities." '3
This justification for judicial review in a democratic society has weaknesses
to be sure. For one thing, most constitutional provisions represent the voice
of people from another century. Their preferences may bear no relationship
to the will of the people today, other than the absence of an extraordinary
majority sufficiently aroused to comply with the requisites for constitutional
amendment. For another, "there is obviously wide room for honest difference
of opinion over the meaning of the general phrases in the Constitution."' 6
This generality of language virtually requires the Court to provide substantive
content to the Constitution. The same is true of changed conditions not contemplated by the framers. Nevertheless, the idea that judicial review should
effectuate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution has a certain
compelling logic - a logic recognized even by those who would not limit judicial
review to expounding ideals found within the four corners of the written
6 5
Constitution.
" Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 697. See also, Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 391;
Act Well Your Part, supra note 78, at 47.
"See, e.g., Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 696.
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 697; see also, Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 391.
"'Thus, Professor Thomas Grey, an articulate advocate of a more expansive, non-interpretivist approach,
has stated:
The rationale's chief virtue is that it supports judicial review while answering the charge that
the practice is undemocratic .. . . [W]hen a court strikes down a popular statute or practice as
unconstitutional, it may also reply to the resulting public outcry: "We didn't do it - you did."
The people have chosen the principle that the statute or practice violated, have designated it as
fundamental, and have written it down in the text of the Constitution for the judges to interpret
and apply.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975). See also, Berger,
Government by Judiciary: John HartEly's Invitation, 54 IND.L.J. 277, 281-82 (1979); Strong, Bicentennial

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983

27

Akron Law
Review,
Vol.REVIEW
16 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 1
LAW
AKRON
V.

[Vol. 16:4

STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S INTERPRETIVISM

To place Justice Rehnquist's approach to constitutional adjudication in
perspective, a brief conceptual digression into the recently vigorous debate over
66
"interpretivism" vs. "non-interpretivism" may be helpful.' Interpretivism
is the position that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine
themselves to enforcing values or norms that are stated or very clearly implicit
in the written Constitution," while noninterpretivismembodies "the contrary
view that courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce values
' 67
or norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document.'
The non-interpretive view recognizes the importance of constitutional text and
historical intentions and generally concedes that explicit constitutional text cannot be nullified by unwritten "higher law" principles or appeals to "fundamental" societal values.' 6s But it does insist that constitutional text may be
supplemented by unwritten principles - whether denominated higher law,
natural law, fundamental values, rights essential to the concept of ordered liberty
69
or something else - as additional sources of constitutional doctrine." The
interpretive-noninterpretive distinction is frequently treated as a dichotomy,
but most commentators recognize the existence of intermediate positions between
Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitutional Processes, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1, 114 (1976);
Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 787-88
(1971).
16'As John Hart Ely explains, this persisting dichotomy in constitutional theory has undergone name changes
through the years. "Strict constructionism" is a term that might be used to designate something like
interpretivism, but Ely discards it because of its connotations, especially in the Nixon years, of "judgments
that will please political conservatives." J. ELY, supra note 83, at 1. The interpretivism-noninterpretivism
dichotomy is similar to the one between positivism and natural law; that is, "[i]nterpretivism is about
the same thing as positivism, and natural law approaches are surely one form of noninterpretivism." Id.
(emphasis in original). Ely prefers interpretivism and noninterpretivism over these older terms because
the older terms "have acquired baggage that can mislead." Id.
The end of such terminological evolution is not in sight. At the admitted cost of "proliferating
neologisms," Paul Brest has suggested the use of "originalism" and "nonoriginalism" to designate the
same two concepts. Brest states: "Virtually all modes of constitutional decisionmaking, including those
endorsed by Professor Ely, require interpretation. The differences lie in what is being interpreted, and
I use the term 'originalism' to describe the interpretation of text and original history as distinguished,
for example, from the interpretation of precedents and social values." Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 204 n.1 (1980).
167J.ELY, supra note 83, at 1. See also Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility,
53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978). Ely's definition follows that suggested by Grey. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). Brest's definition of "originalism" is generally similar. Brest,
supra note 166, at 204. Lind's "textualism" is also analogot~s to "interpretivism" and "originalism."
Lind, supra note 39, at 102.
'"See Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1978). In support of the noninterpretive position Grey elaborates his thesis
of an original understanding prevailing among the framers of the Constitution that "unwritten higher
law principles had constitutional status." Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?. 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 717 (1975). For a more extreme version of noninterpretivism which treats the "text and original
history as important but not necessarily authoritative," see Brest, supra note 166, at 228 & passim.
"'For recent expressions of this viewpoint, other than Grey and Brest, see A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976); Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court,
46 WASH. L. REV. 1, 31-45 (1970); Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976). See also Peebles, A Call to High
Debate: The Organic Constitution in Its Formative Era, 1890-1920, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 49 (1980).
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the most literal, "clause-bound" interpretivism and the forms of noninterpretivism most heavily laden with values extraneous to the Constitution.' 70
Given these definitions we have no hesitation in classifying Justice Rehnquist as interpretivist. His published comments leave no doubt of his conviction that judicial review loses all legitimacy when it departs from the language
and intent of the basic document:
Once we have abandoned the idea that the authority of the courts to declare
laws unconstitutional is somehow tied to the language of the Constitution that the people adopted, a judiciary exercising the power of judicial
review appears in quite a different light. Judges then are no longer the
keepers of the covenant; instead they are a small group of fortunately
situated people with a roving commission to second-guess Congress, state
legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what
is best for the country. 171
For him any right protected by the Court against majority action must be "found
in the language of the Constitution and not elsewhere," 7 and he has frequently
expressed concern that judges may too often be looking "elsewhere."' 73 The
Civil War amendments, with their extremely broad language, have posed a constant temptation for Courts to fill in the details by resort to extra-constitutional
values. When "provisions of the Constitution are so broad and so capable of
differing interpretation . . . few mortals who occupy the position of judges
can be wholly free of the temptation to read into such a document their own
personal prejudices and predilections." ' ' 74 Too often the broad provisions of
these amendments have become a general warrant for social problem-solving
by the Court, in which judges simply end up imposing their personal moral
and social preferences on others. This, in fact, becomes almost inevitable when
and intent of
the justices loose themselves from the moorings of the language
75
amendments.'
its
and
Constitution
those who framed the
"Ely identifies "clause-bound interpretivism" with the extreme view that provisions of the Constitution
are self-contained units to be construed without injection of content from outside the provision. Ely had
aligned himself with the interpretivists (although not of the extreme variety). Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). By 1978 he had reluctantly moved closer
to the noninterpretive position. See Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism:Its Allure and Impossibility, supra
note 167. For other statements of a noninterpretivist viewpoint, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
(1977); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Linde,
Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Monaghan, Of "'Liberty" and
"Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Strong, BicentennialBenchmark: Two Centuriesof Evolution
of ConstitutionalProcesses, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1976).
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 698.
2
" Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 642 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting); Act Well Your Part, supra
note 78, at 44, 45, 47; Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 391; Living Constitution, supra note 78,
at 697-98, 702.
"'Government by Cliche, supra note 78, at 391.
""'It should not be easy for any individual or group of individuals to impose by law their value judgments
upon fellow citizens who may disagree with those judgments. Indeed, it should not be easier just because
the individual in question is a judge." Living Constitution, supra note 78. at 705-06.
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Although Justice Rehnquist's utterances place him squarely in the "interpretivist" camp, he is not what Ely calls the "clause-bound" interpretivist. 176
Rather his approach, again using Ely's characterization of intepretivism, "might
admit that a number of constitutional phrases cannot intelligibly be given content solely on the basis of their language and surrounding legislative history,
indeed that certain of them seem on their face to call for an injection of content from some source beyond the provision, but hold nonetheless that the theory
one employs to supply that content should be derived from the general themes
of the entire constitutional document and not from some source entirely beyond
its four comers." 7 7 This is roughly synonymous with Grey's "pure interpretive"
model, which:
contemplates that the courts may look through the sometimes opaque text
to the purposes behind it in determining constitutional norms. Normative
inferences may be drawn from silences and omissions, from structures
and relationshps, as well as explicit commands . . ..
What distinguishes the exponent of the pure interpretive model is his
insistence that the only norms used in constitutional adjudication must
be those inferable from the text - that the Constitution must not be seen
as licensing courts to articulate and apply contemporary norms not
demonstrably expressed or implied by the framers.' 8
These excerpts from Ely and Grey capsulize remarkably well the tests of constitutionality that Justice Rehnquist has identified. His insistence that judicial
review be "somehow tied to the language of the Constitution"' 79 and that protected rights be "found in the language of the Constitution and not elsewhere"' 8 °
are the essence of the interpretive model. Taken in isolation, these comments
might suggest an affinity with Ely's "clause-bound" interpretivism, or what
Grey calls "literalism."' 8 ' That impression is quickly dispelled, however, when
his beliefs about the Constitution as a "fundamental charter" are taken into
account. Reliance upon an "implicit ordering of relationships within the federal
system""'8 which yields "tacit postulates" having as much force as express constitutional provisions" is clearly not consistent with the literalist, clause-bound
approach to constitutional interpretation. It is, however, quite consistent with
"6According to Ely, the "clause-bound" approach suggests "that the various provisions of the Constitution
be approached essentially as self-contained units and interpreted on the basis of their language, with whatever
interpretive help the legislative history can provide, without significant injection of content from outside
the provision." J. ELY, supra note 83, at 12-13.
"'Id. at 12. Ely does not attribute this position to Justice Rehnquist, but the authors think it accurately
characterizes the Rehnquist approach to constitutional adjudication.
"'Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 n.9 (1975). Grey would call
"literalism" what Ely calls "clause-bound" interpretivism. Id.
"'Living Constitution, supra note 78, at 698.
"'Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. at 179.
"'See supra note 170.
"'Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 433, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
,831d.
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interpretation that relies upon "general themes of the entire constitutional
document" 84 and draws normative inferences "from silences and omissions,
from structures and relationships, as well as explicit commands." 8 '
It is this structural approach to constitutional analysis that explains, and
gives consistency to, Rehnquist's frequently criticized decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery,'16 which invalidated a federal law extending minimum
wage and maximum hours provisions to state and local governmental employees.
Professor Shapiro cites this case as the prime example of Justice Rehnquist's
failure to follow his own theory of constitutional interpretation.""7 Shapiro,
however, construes the theory as requiring that a statute be invalidated only
by reference to the language and intent of a particular constitutional text. 8 '
When the Rehnquist philosophy is construed more broadly to include notions
of a constitutional plan, and the concept of state autonomy within that plan,
the National League of Cities decision appears quite consistent with his selfarticulated philosophy of constitutional adjudication. His notions about the
place of states in the federal system are in fact reasonably well articulated in
the NationalLeague of Cities opinion. The analysis is not tied to the examination of any particular constitutional provision, except for a reference to the
tenth amendment, 8 9 because none is specifically relevant to the wage and hour
question. But his opinion leaves no doubt of the important role assigned to
states in the implicit ordering of constitutional relationships.1 9 Perhaps the
opinion was deficient in not referring specifically to other provisions of the
Constitution from which state autonomy might be implied. Reference was made,
however, to Fry v. United States' 9' in which his ideas on the subject were more
fully developed.' 92 In Fry he had cited both the tenth and eleventh amendments
as "examples of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Con"14J. ELY, supra note 83, at 12.
"'Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27

STAN.

L. REv. 703, 706 n.9 (1975).

'426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"'Shapiro, supra note 61, at 306-07.
"'Id.For a statement of the Rehnquist philosophy he relies primarily on assertions in the Texas Law School
address that judicial review must be "somehow tied to the language of the Constitution," Living
Constitution, supra note 78, at 698, and must not go beyond "a generously fair reading of the language
and intent of that document . . ." Id. at 704.
"'The tenth amendment reserves undelegated powers "to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
"'Rehnquist states that:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the State's power to determine the wages which shall
be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those
persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may be called upon
to work overtime. The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are "functions
essential to separate and independent existence" ... [Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (quoting
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869))] so that Congress may not abrogate the State's
otherwise plenary authority to make them.
426 U.S. at 845-46.
" 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
"'1426 U.S. at 843. See Fry, 421 U.S. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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stitution that the States were sovereign in many respects."' 93 Thus, while the
Justice might be faulted for not fully elaborating his rationale within the four
corners of the NationalLeague of Cities opinion, the allegation of failing to
follow his own constitutional theory is surely not well taken. The decision is
undeniably linked to the language and intent of the Constitution - the intent
deducible from the Framers' understanding of state sovereignty, and constitutionally to be implied at least from the tenth and eleventh amendments. One
may disagree about the Framers' understanding, or the implications to be drawn
from the two amendments, or the propriety of invalidating congressional enactments on the basis of implied notions about the proper ordering of federal
relationships. But there is no gainsaying that these concepts are express and
integral parts of Justice Rehnquist's theory of constitutional adjudication.
One additional aspect of Justice Rehnquist's philosophy requires mention
- his attitude toward stare decisis. It is clear that he does not regard stare
decisis in constitutional cases as a principle of overriding importance. This was
readily deducible from his testimony at the time of his nomination,"' and it
has become increasingly apparent ever since. He specifically subscribes to the
Brandeis philosophy 9 ' that precedent need not be accorded as much weight
in a constitutional case as in a statutory case. As Justice Rehnquist has repeated
the rationale, "[I1f the Court is wrong on a question of constitutional law,
Congress can't simply change it by a statute passed by the House and Senate.
It requires the process of a constitutional amendment and an extraordinary
majority, which is very difficult to do."' 9 6 If the Court makes a mistake on
a statutory decision, on the other hand, Congress can correct that mistake with
relative ease. In taking this point of view Justice Rehnquist may not be far
from the prevailing attitude on the modern Court, although he is more
outspoken that the rest in stating his willingness to reconsider and overrule
precedent.' 9 7
VI. REHNQUIST ON POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Since his appointment to the Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist has not
spoken out extra-judicially on the subject of his own political ideology. His
pre-appointment utterances, canvassed thoroughly at the nomination hearings,
are of course still on the record, and the tenor of those comments is distinctly
in the mold of political conservatism. His written opinions since 1972, to the
extent they have addressed questions subject to political controversy, have done
nothing to dispel the conservative image. Arguments in support of state
'19421 U.S. at 557. See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 433, 439 (1979).
'"See Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 16-86.
'"Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
I" William H. Rehnquist: A Profile of a Supreme Court Justice, K.U. LAWS, April 9, 1975, at 11.
'"See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan
415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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sovereignty, a denial of most appeals from criminal conviction, and a narrow
view of first amendment rights (and of civil liberties generally) have certainly
been consistent with his previously expressed political opinions.
While refraining from public discussion of his own ideological leanings,
Justice Rehnquist has specifically recognized the relevance of ideology to the
judicial function. In a 1975 lecture on the subject of judicial independence,
he observed that "most Presidents whom historians regard as 'strong' Presidents
considered what political, social and legal philosophy their Supreme Court
nominees would follow after donning their judicial robes. The fact that
Presidents have frequently been disappointed in their expectations does not
This modest
detract from the fact that they properly considered the matter."
endorsement of ideology as a relevant factor in judicial selection was presumably
not intended as carte blanche for a judge to indulge his ideological bent in
disregard of all constitutional principle. At the hearings on his nomination,
he expressed a hope that he would dissociate his personal preferences "to the
greatest extent possible" from his role as a judge.' 9 9 His whole self-articulated
judicial philosophy exalts a "neutral principles" approach and denigrates decision rules based on current social values or personal predilections of judges.
Nevertheless, his comments about ideology in the judicial selection process
plainly registers the practical realization that a judge cannot be expected to
divest himself entirely of all ideological baggage as a prerequisite to the proper
performance of his judicial function.
VII.

THE OPERATIVE PHILOSOPHY: THE REHNQUIST DECISION RECORD

The preceding discussion of Justice Rehnquist's philosophy has quoted
excerpts from a number of Rehnquist opinions. The purpose of that analysis
was to identify the principles Justice Rehnquist perceives as guiding his judicial
decision making. In this section, the article will survey the decided cases more
systematically with reference to the results for which Justice Rehnquist voted.
From this examination this article will derive some of the operative rules that
appear actually to guide his decisions.
The universe of cases initially selected for analysis included all those decided
by written opinion during the 1976 through the 1981 terms of the United States
Supreme Court, in which Justice Rehnquist participated.100 From this universe
the authors sorted out the cases relevant to this article's analytical categories,
and the results are presented in Table 1 (Appendix A) and Table 2 (Appendix
B). Table 1 includes all cases in which a governmental unit was a party on one
side, the four major categories in Table 1 (state criminal, state civil, federal
"Political Battles, supra note 78, at 849.
"'Nomination Hearings, supra note 2, at 27.
"'*Cases handled by summary disposition or denial of certiorari, though accompanied by written dissents
in some instances, were excluded from the survey as not being decided by written opinion. Cases decided
by a 4-4 tie vote, and hence resulting in affirmance without written opinion, were also excluded.
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criminal, federal civil cases) being mutually exclusive. By contrast, the three
principal categories in Table 2 (state acts, federal jurisdiction, freedom of expression) substantially overlap in their case coverage with Table 1 and with
each other.
Because the tables compress so much information , they must be examined
in detail. Most of the categories are adaptations of the propositions propounded
by Shapiro in his 1976 "preliminary view" of Justice Rehnquist." ' In summary,
these are: (1) conflicts between an individual and the government are resolved
in favor of the government; (2) conflicts between state and federal authority
are resolved in favor of the states; and (3) questions of the exercise of federal
jurisdiction are resolved against such exercise.2 °2 The data in Table 1 pertain
solely to the first proposition, but in order to make possible a more
discriminating analysis, the cases are further classified by governmental party
(state/local or federal) and by criminal or civil subject matter. Of the total
universe of cases, only those in which government was a party on one side are
represented in the Table. If government was a party on both sides the case
was excluded in order to retain the integrity of the classification of government versus a private party. 0 3 The reach of this sample is somewhat broader
than Shapiro's since he excluded federal tax cases as well as disputes "solely
between organizations acting on their own behalf, such as corporations and
"0....
"4 We did exclude one other small
labor unions, and the government
group of cases, however, because they could not be readily classified with respect
to the result for which Justice Rehnquist voted. These were cases having multiple
holdings, not all favoring the same party. If the outcome of the vote was obviously more favorable to one side, the case was included in the sample; otherwise it was omitted as not classifiable.
Table 1 supports the proposition that Justice Rehnquist tends to vote for
governmental agencies in their disputes with private parties, whether of a criminal
or non-criminal nature. He votes to sustain federal criminal prosecutions with
somewhat greater frequency than state prosecutions, overall 90.30% to 85.3%,
but he supports the state more often in civil cases, 79.6% to 68.3%. The differential with respect to criminal cases probably reflects the fact that federal
prosecutions are more carefully conducted, on the average, than state prosecutions. This surmise is strengthened by comparison with the record of the Court
as a whole, which sustained the federal government in 69.9% of the criminal
cases but upheld the state only 53.8% of the time. The difference between Justice
Reunquist and the Court majority - thirty-two percentage points for state
criminal cases but only twenty percentage points for federal - may also be
"'Shapiro, supra note 61, at 294.
"'Id. In the original all three propositions are qualified by the phrase "whenever possible." Id.
"'Separate figures for each term are presented in the Table, but the analysis is confined to the Table as
a whole because the patterns for each term are similar. The data disclose no significant trends over time,
and annual fluctuations appear to be random.
11'Shapiro,
supra note 61, at 294 n.3.
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some measure of his greater solicitude for state sovereignty and autonomy.
The solicitude for state and local prerogative is even more marked in the comparison of governmental support percentages in civil cases. Justice Rehnquist
is twenty-six percentage points above the Court majority in favoring state government parties but has a support rate three percentage points below that of the
majority for cases involving the federal government.
On close examination, Table 1 probably ought not to be read as evidence
of a generalized pro-government bias in Rehnquist decisions. The conclusion
reached depends to some extent on the norm utilized. If fifty percent is the
norm or standard for absence of bias, the Justice is clearly biased on the progovernment side. If, on the other hand, we take the Court majority position
as the norm (which requires an assumption that an unbiased person would hold
the federal government to be "right" about seventy percent of the time, while
the state government is right less often), Justice Rehnquist exhibits no general
bias in favor of the federal government. He is above the norm for criminal cases
but slightly below for civil cases. His values thus appear too differentiated for
accurate classification on a single pro- or anti-government scale. Rather, he
appears to have a preference for state autonomy as reflected in his percentage
differences with the majority, and a bias toward order when order and liberty
are weighed in the balance. The twenty percentage point differential for federal
criminal cases, as compared with the absence of significant difference for federal
civil cases, measures the bias toward order; the twenty-six percentage point
differential for state civil cases, as compared with federal civil cases measures
the preference for state autonomy; and the thirty-two percentage point difference for state criminal cases suggests a cumulative impact of both values
- state autonomy and social order.
The categories in Table 2 are drawn to reflect Shapiro's second and third
propositions - preference for the state in federal/state conflicts and a restrictive view of the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. One additional category
- cases involving first amendment freedom of expression and association is also included in Table 2. It is, for the most part, a specialized subset of the
cases pitting government against private parties, and was suggested by the Lind
20 5
article on Justice Rehnquist and first amendment speech in the labor context.
The columns labeled "Votes For or Against Validity of State Acts," speak
generally to Shapiro's second proposition, i.e., that conflicts between state and
federal authority should be resolved in favor of the state.2"6 Here our principal criterion for state-federal conflict is the existence of a challenge to a state
law or act on the ground that it conflicts with the United States Constitution,
or any federal statute, regulation, executive act or court order.
2
'"Lind, supra note 39, at 93. The category does not include cases arising from the religion clauses of
the first amendment.
"'The authors are not sure of the precise correspondence because Shapiro presents only minimal data
and does not state very specifically how he identifies cases which reflect conflict "between state and federal
authority, whether on an executive, legislative, or judicial level .... " Shapiro, supra note 61, at 294.
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In developing the subset of cases dealing with the exercise of federal jurisdiction we defined "exercise of jurisdiction" very broadly to include virtually any

preliminary question that must be resolved before the Court can reach the
substance of the controversy or claim. Thus we include issues relating to
standing, ripeness, mootness, abstention and justiciability generally, as well
as the interpretation of particular statutes and constitutional provisions that
07
may confer jurisdiction upon the courts, expressly or by implication.
Table 2 is subject to the straightforward interpretation that Justice Rehn-

quist is prone to uphold the validity of state acts against a constitutional attack
or other federal challenge, to vote against the exercise of federal jurisdiction,
and to limit the scope of first amendment protection. These generalizations
reflect not only the relative frequency with which he asserts such positions,
but also his voting as compared with the Court majority.2 "' All of these positions are consistent with the central value of state sovereignty and autonomy.
Negative votes on the exercise of federal jurisdiction more often than not are
votes to insulate state laws or acts from federal review, and nearly all of the
first amendment cases involve state rather than federal action.
VIII.

EXPLAINING THE "UNEXPECTED"

VOTES

Some additional light may be shed on the voting record by looking at the
cases in which Justice Rehnquist did not vote as expected - when he voted
in favor of the individual rather than the government, or in support of a federal
challenge to the validity of a state act. In contests between a private party and

a state agency, the great majority of Rehnquist votes in favor of the private
party occurred in cases decided without a dissenting vote, or at least with no
vote less favorable to the private party than Justice Rehnquist's. 20 9 Of twenty
state criminal cases in which the Justice favored the defendant over the pro-

secution, nineteen (95%) were decided without dissent. 210 Of forty-nine state
207

This seems to comport with the Shapiro approach. He also defines "exercise of jurisdiction" quite broadly,
to include such matters as "justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness, and equitable discretion." Id.
at 294 n.4.
"'As in Table 1, no significant trends over time are apparent, although the most recent (1981) term shows
a lessened hostility to first amendment values. The Justice supported the first amendment claim in five
of 13 cases, as compared with five of 50 cases during the preceding five terms.
"'In some instances one or more justices did not participate in the decision and the vote of 8-0 or 7-0
was unanimous only as to those participating. In a few cases one or more members of the Court dissented
from the position espoused by Justice Rehnquist, but only because they would have given the private party
even more favorable treatment. Such cases are considered "unanimous" decisions for purposes of explaining
the Rehnquist vote because no one urged less favorable treatment of the private party than Rehnquist.
"'In Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), the Court (per Justice Rehnquist) was unanimous in holding
that a non-unanimous six-person jury in a state criminal trial for a non-petty offense violated the right
to a jury trial guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments. However, three dissenters would have
reversed defendant's conviction outright. Id. at 140 (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In Wood
v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), Justice Rehnquist voted with the Court in remanding a state court decision
to revoke defendant's probation for nonpayment of a fine. The four dissenters in the case would have
reversed outright. This also is treated as a unanimous decision. Although one of the four dissenters flatly
disagreed with the Court's rationale for remand, id. at 275 (White, J., dissenting), all four dissenters
advocated a position more favorable to the defendants than that taken by the Court. Id. at 274 (Brennan,
Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 275 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. (White, J., dissenting).
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civil cases in which Justice Rehnquist supported the private party, thirty-three
(67%) were decided without a dissenting vote on the side of the state. The cases
involving federal challenge to state acts, which overlap substantially with the
preceding two categories, show a similar pattern. Of eighty-two cases in which
the Justice voted in favor of the federal challenge, sixty-five (79%) were decided
without dissent. 2"' The significance of these figures seems obvious. The values
that predispose Justice Rehnquist to give great deference to state actions within
the federal system are capable of being overridden by facts and law that dictate
a contrary result. The predisposition is obviously strong, but it does not give
rise to a knee-jerk reaction. When the case for the private party is persuasive
enough to convince all of the other members of the Court, it is often good
enough to persuade Justice Rehnquist as well. 212
A. Votes Against State Government
This still leaves a number of the Rehnquist votes unexplained. In twentyone' cases in the sample,21 Justice Rehnquist voted against the state or against
the validity of a state act even though one or more of his colleagues took a
position more favorable to the state. Such votes could, of course, be written
off as unexplained aberrations; after all, no one is wholly consistent. Nevertheless, the cases tend to cluster in ways that suggest some consistency even
in the pattern of deviation from the normal posture in favor of state autonomy.
Three of the cases raised a due process challenge by a party alleging that his
contacts with the forum state were insufficient to sustain state court
jurisdiction.2 15 A fourth case raised a similar minimum contacts challenge to
a state court choice of law decision.216 Apparently, in such cases, Justice Rehnquist's concern for due process overrides the bias in favor of state authority.
Perhaps this is because a finding of insufficient contacts does not pose the same
affront to state sovereignty and autonomy as, for example, holding a state law
in violation of the equal protection clause. Generally, the denial of jurisdiction
to the courts of one state is based on a presumption that another state is the
" By contrast, Justice Rehnquist has been joined by a unanimous (or at least non-dissenting) court in
very few of his pro-state government votes - just nine of 115 state criminal cases (8%), 37 of 191 noncriminal cases (19%), and 44 of 332 challenges to the validity of state acts (13%).
"'But not invariably -

Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in 26 of the 883 cases utilized in the analysis.

"'As discussed in the text, 17 Rehnquist votes against the validity of state acts were non-unamimous decisions,
as were 16 votes against the state in non-criminal cases and one vote in a criminal case. Because of the
substantial overlap between categories in Table I and those in Table 2, the 34 unexplained items in the
three categories represent only 21 cases.
"'In tabulating votes for or against state/local government, and for or against the validity of state acts,
eight cases were excluded from the count because the holding supported by Justice Rehnquist ran partly
against the state and partly in favor of the state. Five of these were decided by unanimous vote or without
dissent. With this exception, and the possibility of some inadvertent omission, the "sample" is the whole
universe of cases decided by written opinion in which Justice Rehnquist participated during the 1976-1981
terms.
"'Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
"'Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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more appropriate forum or, with choice of law rules, that the law of some
other state should be applied. To some extent, the intellectual operation involves
weighing the claims of one state against those of another; and a generalized

deference to state autonomy would not necessarily work in favor of the forum
state. In addition these cases pose less of an affront to majority rule because
they merely set aside the decisions of state judges, often non-elected, rather
than the decisions of popularly elected state legislatures.

Nine decisions in this group of twenty-one share another common
characteristic: they construe state rights and obligations under federal legislation rather than reviewing the constitutionality of state acts.2" 7 The absence
of a constitutional question renders values stemming from federalism and state
autonomy less relevant and focusses the inquiry instead upon the intent of

Congress in enacting the legislation, as ascertained from language and legislative
history. A concern for state autonomy might still influence the interpretation
of what Congress intended, but the central value to be vindicated is congressional
intent, not a constitutionally mandated federalism. Such a focus leaves more
room for a holding running contrary to the state claim.
Three other cases raised questions of unlawful taking of private property
by state or local government. 2" Unlike the minimum contacts cases noted above,
the taking cases pose a direct challenge to state (and local) prerogatives, but
in this limited area of the law Justice Rehnquist has recently shown considerable
solicitude for private property rights.I1 9 The same solicitude, reinforced perhaps

by the explicit language of the Constitution, may also account for the Rehnquist votes in two cases reviving the Contract clause 2 0 as a significant limitation upon state action. 2 '
I'Perhaps

not coincidentally, five of the nine cases dealt with alleged racial discrimination, and in each
instance Justice Rehnquist voted against the outcome most favorable to racial minorities. See General
Building Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982); Patsy v. Board of Regents of the
State of Florida, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982); Hathorn v. Lavorn, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (1982); Gladstone Realtors
v. Village of Belwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). Two others were brought under the antitrust laws, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
102 S.Ct. 2466 (1982); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The remaining two cases construed
43 U.S.C. § 641 (1976) in a manner unfavorable to Idaho claims to federal public lands, Andrus v. Idaho,
445 U.S. 715 (1980), and found an Iowa Medicaid procedure to be in conflict with applicable federal
regulations, Herweg v. Roy, 455 U.S. 265 (1982).
"'Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); United States v. Clarke,
445 U.S. 253 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
"'For other recent cases in which Justice Rehnquist indicated sympathy for a "taking" argument, see
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1981); Vaughan v. Vermillion Corp., 444 U.S.
206 (1979). But see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980) (cases in which a unanimous Court found no taking).
""'No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.
U.S. CoNsT. art.
I, § 10, cl.1.
"'Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1 (1977). These two decisions resurrected the Contract clause, which had been virtually read
out of the Constitution by a line of cases running from Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934), through City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
For three other cases in which Justice Rehnquist took a position less favorable to state prerogative
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B. Votes Against the Federal Government
The Rehnquist votes in controversies between private parties and the federal
government show a similar tendency to favor the government over the individual,
highly pronounced in criminal cases, somewhat less so in non-criminal cases.
Fewer of the votes for the private party can be explained on the "unanimity"
theory, however, since only three of nine Rehnquist votes favoring the criminal
defendant, and sixteen of fifty-eight votes favoring private parties in noncriminal matters, occurred in cases decided without dissent.222 This leaves more
cases to be explained by something other than a bias toward government or
a set of facts so compelling that no justice can disagree.

With respect to the six unexplained criminal cases, it may be significant
that none of them involved violent crime against person or property. Perhaps,
in white collar crime, the Justice does not perceive the same grave threat to
the functioning of an orderly society.2 23

The civil cases do not cluster quite so neatly, but at least one pattern is
clear: when a constitutionalquestion is at issue Justice Rehnquist seldom votes
in favor of the private party. Of forty-six federal, non-criminal cases that turned
at least in part on an issue of constitutional interpretation, only five evoked
a Rehnquist vote against the government. 224 In contrast, his votes on 137 civil
cases involving interpretation of federal statutes, regulations, and common law
are more evenly divided between government and private party - eighty-four

for the former and fifty-three for the latter. This might still indicate a significant
pro-government bias, since the distribution is sixty-one percent in favor of the
than one or more of his colleagues, see Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). The first
two cases raised freedom of expression issues, Portash raised an issue of self-incrimination.
22
That is, with no justice taking a position more favorable to the government.
" 3Two raised claims of legislative immunity from criminal prosecution, United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.
360 (1980); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979). Three others turned on the question whether
defendant's conduct was in fact proscribed by the relevant criminal statute. Williams v. United States,
102 S. Ct. 3088 (1982); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 4343 U.S. 275 (1978). One, Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978), reversed an obscenity
conviction.
"'Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982); Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Gibbons and
Marathon were unusual cases invalidating congressional bankruptcy legislation; Kaiser Aetna involved
a "taking" without just compensation; and Nixon, dealing with custody of presidential papers, presented
a separation of powers issue rather than a typical question of individual rights. Fullilove was a classic
case of reverse racial discrimination arising from a provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977 which required that ten percent of federal funds for local public works be used to procure supplies
or services from minority owned businesses.
One other case also falls partly in this category, United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). This was
a class action filed by a number of U.S. District Court judges challenging the validity of congressional
statutes that in four consecutive years had stopped or reduced previously authorized cost-of-living salary
increases for judges (and others). The judges contended that revoking the increases ran afoul of the
Compensation clause which provides that the compensation of judges "shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 1. This case is omitted from the tabulation because
the holding was not readily classifiable as a vote "for" or "against" the government. The Court held
the revocation valid for two of the years and invalid the other two.
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federal government. However, Justice Rehnquist voted for the government less
often than the Court majority, which support the government position in ninety5
four (compared with Rehnquist's eighty-four) of the 137 cases." These figures
suggest that the pro-government bias that differentiates Justice Rehnquist from
his colleagues in deciding constitutional issues has no application to questions
of statutory interpretation. If any bias exists it actuates his colleagues, collectively, more than him. Perhaps a sounder conclusion, with respect to this class
of cases, is that no obvious overarching value posture dictates outcomes in one
direction or another. If the analysis were extended to additional sub-categories
of cases, other biases might of course appear. For example, Spaeth and Teger
found that twenty-six of thirty-two Rehnquist votes in non-unanimous cases
raising a challenge to decisions of federal regulatory commissions, 1971-1977,
226
could be explained by a pro-business or anti-labor bias. No doubt other
specialized groups of cases would justify other hypotheses. For cases that do
not conform to a particular explanatory hypothesis we might even find modest
relevance in the traditional, pre-realist model of the judge who simply tries
to determine the law and apply it evenhandedly on a case-by-case basis. In any
event, the federal statutory cases are not as easy to explain in terms of a few
central propositions as are the federal criminal cases, or most cases to which
states are parties.
C. Votes Favoring the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The 159 cases tabulated in the middle columns of Table 2, relating to the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction, once more show a clear deviation from
the majority. Justice Rehnquist has an unmistakable preference for limiting
rather than expanding access to federal courts. Table 2 shows the Justice voting
against the exercise of federal jurisdiction in 105 of 159 cases, compared with
the majority support for the party seeking access in nearly half the cases. The
preference is even more marked when unaminous (or non-dissenting) votes are
taken into account. In forty of fifty-four cases in which Justice Rehnquist
favored the exercise of jurisdiction, the arguments were so convincing that no
member of the Court dissented on the jurisdictional question. Thus, he voted
in favor of exercising jurisdiction on just fourteen occasions when any other
member of the Court voted in the negative.
In four of the fourteen cases only one justice dissented on the jurisdictional question."' Three other Rehnquist votes to exercise jurisdiction may have
"'Correspondingly, the majority decided in favor of the government less often in the cases raising
constitutional issues - 37 of 46 cases as compared with Rehnquist's 41 of 46. Based on cases decided
through the 1975 term, Shapiro concluded that "Justice Rehnquist often votes against the government"
when "the issue involves the reach of government regulation or control, in antitrust cases or cases involving
labor-managment relations, for example..." Shapiro, supranote 61, at 294 n.3. Shapiro cites four cases
as examples, and the authors found at least 25 post-1976 cases that further illustrate the point. Nevertheless,
in such cases Justice Rehnquist has voted far more often (the authors found approximately 45 cases) in
favor of the government, as have also his fellow justices.
6
11 Spaeth & Teger, supra note 34, at 278-82.
.. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982); Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446
U.S. 458 (1980); Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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been rooted in deference to state governmental entities, which were seeking
review of lower court decisions."' The remaining cases do not fit any identifiable pattern.229 In three of them Justice Rehnquist virtually apologized for
the position he was taking, by indicating a willingness to reconsider previous
232
precedent23 or urging Congress to change the law. 23' In Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
the recent presidential immunity case, one can speculate that a desire to reach
the substantive issue may have overridden Justice Rehnquist's normal inclination to restrict jurisdiction. A year earlier, in the Kissinger wiretapping case,
an evenly divided court was unable to resolve the issue of absolute presidential
immunity from civil damages liability for official acts.233 Fitzgeraldpresented
the same claim in a different factual context, loss of government employment
and damage to reputation, and Justice Rehnquist joined a 5-4 majority in finding
absolute constitutional immunity. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because,
before oral argument, the parties had reached an agreement to liquidate
damages. Under the agreement the former President paid respondent Fitzgerald
$142,000, and agreed to pay an additional $28,000 if the Court held the President was not entitled to absolute immunity. Although the case was not moot,
with $28,000 riding on the outcome, the dissenters contended that this was not
the type of "case or controversy over which we should exercise our power of
discretionary review." 234 Justice Rehnquist apparently was not troubled by such
reservations.
Despite these exceptions, Justice Rehnquist's preference for limiting the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction is apparent in the decisions, and he has
been articulate about stating the preference. Perhaps typical is the following
comment on a constitutional challenge to federal limitations on the liability
of nuclear power generating facilities:233
I can understand the Court's willingness to reach the merits of this
case and thereby remove the doubt which has been cast over this important federal statute. In so doing, however, it ignores established limitations on District Court jurisdiction as carefully defined in our statutes
22

Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90(1981); Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S.
232 (1981); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
"'Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982); Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 102
S. Ct. 2557 (1982); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981); Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Parklane
Hosiery Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Public Utilities Comm'n
of California, 434 U.S. 9 (1977).
"'Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
" Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
"'1102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
"'Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
114102 S. Ct. at 2727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These three justices also joined Justice White in dissenting
on the merits.
"'The statute in question was 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
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and cases. Because I believe the preservation of these limitations is in the
long run more important to this Court's jurisprudence than the resolution of any particular case or controversy, however important, I too would
reverse the judgment of the District Court but would do 23so6 with instructions to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
In Maryland v. Louisiana,23 7 he made a similar plea for restraint in exercising
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. While admitting that the case fell
within the literal terms of constitutional and statutory grants of original jurisdiction, he nevertheless urged the Court on prudential grounds not to assume
jurisdiction: "It has been a consistent and dominant theme in decisions of this
Court that our original jurisdiction should be exercised with considerable
restraint and only after searching inquiry into the necessity for doing so." 23
This was a case, he concluded, in which no such necessity was shown.239
He has urged the same posture of restraint with respect to standing and
other questions of justiciability:
is of crucial importance to conObedience to the rules of standing .
stitutional adjudication in this Court, for when the parties leave these halls,
what is done cannot be undone except by constitutional amendment.
Much as "Caesar had his Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell,"
Congress and the States have this Court to ensure that their legislative
Acts do not run afoul of the limitations imposed by the United States
Constitution. But the Court has neither a Brutus nor a Cromwell to impose
a similar discipline on it. Thus, "the only check upon our own exercise
of power is our own sense of self-restraint." ... I do not think the Court,
in deciding the merits of appellant's constitutional claim, has exercised
the self-restraint that Art. III requires in this case.24 0
His reluctance to imply private rights of action from statutes has already been
noted, 2 ' and he has been even more adamantly against implying such rights
directly from the Constitution: "In my view, it is 'an exercise of power that
the Constitution does not give us' for this Court to infer a private civil damage
remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional provision." 2" 2
He also has strongly endorsed the Younger doctrine24 3 of federal court
"'Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 95-96 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
237451 U.S. 725 (1981).
at 761 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13'Id.
"'Id. at 770-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"'Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 300 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Orr case overturned Alabama's for-wivesonly alimony statute on equal protection grounds upon the petition of a former husband who himself
made no claim to alimony.
1"'See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"'Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1'Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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nonintervention in state court proceedings, as a matter of respect for the proper
functioning of states in the federal system."' Such expressions leave little doubt
that the Rehnquist voting record on questions relating to the exercise of federal
court jurisdiction was not achieved through inadvertence."4 5
D. Votes Favoring Free Speech
In the last Table 2 category, freedom of expression, the cases in which
Justice Rehnquist voted in favor of first amendment rights, contrary to expectations, can be explained largely on the unanimity principle. In seven of the
ten cases, the appropriate outcome was obvious enough that no one voted against
it,"4' and only one justice dissented from each of the other three decisions. 47
IX. CONCLUSION

Justice Rehnquist's record as a member of the United States Supreme Court
might plausibly be explained as an expression of his leaning toward political
conservatism. His support for state sovereignty and autonomy, his manifest
reluctance to reverse criminal convictions, his narrow reading of first amendment rights, and his general willingness to subordinate civil liberty claims to
."Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Rehnquist
also protested against the Court's "unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction and imposition on state courts."
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 242 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Jerome
the Court vacated a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision denying a mandamus to a newspaper publisher
seeking access to a pretrial suppression hearing.
''For a more generalized discussion of Supreme Court behavior on access questions, see Atkins & Taggart,
Substantive Access Doctrinesand Conflict Management in the U.S. Supreme Court: Reflections on Activism
and Restraint, in SUPREME COURT AcTivisM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb ed. 1982).
"'NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982); Brown v. Hartlage, 102 S. Ct. 1523 (1982);
In the Matter of R__ M. J_, 102 S.Ct. 929 (1982); Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Schol Dist.,
439 U.S. 410 (1979) (private as well as public speech protected); Landmark Communication, Inc., v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978) (right to publish information of judicial commission proceedings); Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (right to publish name of juvenile obtained in proceeding to
which press admitted); Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n., 429 U.S.
167 (1976) (possibility of interference with collective bargaining agreement does not override teacher's
right to speak in a public school board meeting). In Claiborne Hardware Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the result but probably did not endorse the first amendment analysis. 102 S. Ct. at 3437 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
"'Of those three, Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978), reversed an obscenity conviction because
of a jury instruction including "children" as part of the relevant community for the purpose of determining
community standards of obscenity. Justice Powell, the lone dissenter, agreed with the Court that the
instruction was improper, but nevertheless penned a two-sentence dissent because he held it to be harmless
error. Id. at 306 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice White was the sole dissenter in each of the other two
cases, both decided during the 1981 term. In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1982), the Court held
that a state university's denial of the use of its facilities to a student religious group, when other student
groups were permitted to use them, constituted impermissible content-based regulation of speech. Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1982), invalidated a Berkeley city ordinance imposing
a limit of $250 on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures subject to
popular vote.
One first amendment case, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), is omitted from
the tabulation because the Rehnquist position could not be classified as wholly favoring or disfavoring
the first amendment claims. Rehnquist joined the Court in holding that the first amendment barred
compulsory contributions by public school teachers for ideological union expenditures not directly related
to collective bargaining, but did not bar contributions for union expenditures related to collective bargaining.
Id. at 235-36.
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governmental authority are readily identifiable as conservative positions as the
term is currently understood. And yet, the notion that Justice Rehnquist takes
judicial cues from contemporary currents of political conservatism is not a very
satisfying or, in our opinion, a wholly accurate explanation of his judicial
behavior. The root motivation is philosophical, not political.24 8 The underlying rationale is not directed toward an allocation of power or distribution of
rewards that favors certain political groups, although every judicial decision
has the effect of favoring one group or another. Rather, his decisions - at
least those requiring constitutional interpretation - appear rooted in a
philosophy of constitutional adjudication which he has clearly articulated in
public addresses and judicial opinions. The key elements of that philosophy
have been identified earlier in this article: (1) The fundamental plan of the Constitution places great importance upon state sovereignty and weights order
equally with liberty in the balance of social values; (2) Judges should defer
to the popular will as expressed by elected representatives in duly enacted laws
and in the Constitution itself; (3) Since judicial review is a check upon the will
of popular majorities, judges should not invalidate legislation unless they are
sure the Constitution requires it. What the Constitution requires must be ascertained from the language of the Constitution, including necessary implications
from the constitutional plan, and the framers' intent where that can be
determined.
Most of Justice Rehnquist's judicial decision making can be explained by
reference to these three broad propositions. The obvious concern for limiting
federal encroachment upon state prerogatives, epitomized by NationalLeague
of Cities v. Usery but also evident in many of his votes to limit the exercise
of federal court jurisdiction, is fundamental to the "implicit ordering of relationships" that he perceives within the constitutional plan. The special reluctance to overturn a criminal prosecution expresses his notion of the proper constitutional balance between order and liberty. His reluctance to support first
amendment claims of free expression evinces a similar balancing of social and
individual utilities. The consistent support of state and federal legislation against
constitutional challenge reflects the broad deference to majority rule. His
relatively few votes against the validity of a legislative act can often be traced
to some fairly explicit constitutional provision 249 or to structural implications
drawn from the constitutional plan.25

2

"'Powell also observes that "Rehnquist's constitutional theory is more complex and less oriented toward
particular political goals" than is commonly recognized. Justice Rehnquist's allegiance to his vision of
federalism sometimes leads to liberal rather than conservative substantive outcomes. Powell, supra note
56, at 1319 n.ll. For Powell's comment on such cases, see supra note 57.
.. 'E.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (Compensation clause); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980); (Equal Protection clause); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (Contract clause).
2
'E.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (state sovereignty and autonomy); Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (separation of powers).
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The argument that Justice Rehnquist responds to articulated principles
of constitutional adjudication, rather than to an ideological preference for
governmental authority or for local interests, is strengthened by his decision
pattern in cases that do not raise constitutional issues. There the pro-government,
pro-state bias is much less pronounced. He votes for states less often, and for
the federal government less often, when the issue is one of interpreting or
applying federal statutes and regulations. In constitutional cases, a decision
permitting federal encroachment upon state functions and powers runs counter
to the ordering of relationships in the constitutional plan. Likewise, when an
individual raises a constitutional challenge to state or federal legislation, a decision in favor of the individual must unavoidably derogate from the principle
of majority rule by voiding laws duly enacted by popularly chosen legislatures.
But questions of statutory interpretation pose no threat to any core values in
the Rehnquist philosophy. No such imperatives govern when the issue is only
the meaning rather than the validity of the people's legislative mandate. When
the philosophy that undergirds constitutional decisions loses its relevance, the
Rehnquist decisions become less uniformly pro-state and pro-government.
If "political conservative" has descriptive relevance but little explanatory
power, does the label of "judicial conservative" either describe or explain his
behavior as a judge? His comments at the Senate hearings on his nomination
indicate that he thought of himself as a judicial conservative, defined as a judge
who construes the Constitution in light of the Framers' intent rather than reading
" ' His opinions have continued to pay at
his own views into the document. 25
least lip service to that concern, and he has consistently sought a basis for decision in the Constitution itself rather than in social or jurisprudential values
external to it. But interpretivism is only one element of judicial conservatism,
and even there his willingness to rely on values implicit in the document as
a whole, without specific textual warrant, leaves much room for the influence
of personal views. He has shown great deference to legislative determinations,
another mark of the judicial conservative; but he has been quite contemptuous
of precedent with which he disagrees, clearly not a conservative attribute. His
reluctance to exercise federal court jurisdiction in marginal cases is consistent
with the judicial conservative's reluctance to decide questions unnecessarily,
and he has frequently called for restraint in avoiding constitutional decisions
when possible252 and deciding cases on the narrowest possible grounds.2 53 But
he has not been consistent in this posture and has sometimes left himself open
to charges of reaching out to decide questions wholly unnecessary to the disposition of the case.25' His behavior is obviously a hybrid, with some characteristics
"See supra text accompanying note 19.
"'See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 411 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Kremens v.
Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 128 (1977).
"'Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
1"See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (majority opinion by Rehnouist), and the accompanying
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of the judicial conservative and others more akin to the judicial activist.
In sum, Justice Rehnquist's performance as a member of the Court is best
explained by reference to his own articulated philosophy of constitutional adjudication. This is not unrelated to his political ideology but it is not simply a cover
for political conservatism. It calls for judicial restraint in many cases, but it
is by no means identical with judicial conservatism. His judicial decision making
does indeed fall in generally consistent patterns, but those patterns are less a
reflection of political or judicial conservatism than of his notions about majority
rule, the Constitution as a government charter, and the function of judicial
review.

Brennan concurrence, id. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S.
Ct. 2083 (1982), and the accompanying Stevens concurrence. See also Federated Department Stores, Inc.
v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), in which Justice Rehnquist, in dictum addressed to an unbriefed, unargued
issue, and placed unobtrusively in a footnote, id. at 397 n.2, approved a significant change in federal
law relating to the removal of cases from state courts. The footnote was all the more remarkable because
it tended to expand the exercise of federal jurisdiction rather than to limit it.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/1

46

JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY
Riggs andREHNQUIST
Proffitt: Rehnquist
Judicial
Philosophy

Spring, 1983]

ON co

00 00
(71,00

W)

tn

€'omrq

Co
en 00
09 rl:

00
,3

kn

00 r-

-00

as 00

00o

.=0

: . I--,
00 o

.

c00 tn6 C14
tr;
'- '.- I..,
C14 C14
en "

o 0

cc

-00

en

'00
00

en
e

C'

W)00

0

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983

Gj

0

1:4

U

*~~c

000

00~~

0 0

47

AKRON
Akron Law
Review,LAW
Vol. REVIEW
16 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 1

~

;0-

F i00

.

NT

..

[Vol. 16:4

i

t

C4

00-

w'-r

oo

r-

IC

-

,4r>

QN00

ONC)
cqC4

U

(5

Q

000,C;0

0O

(O 0 0

1

C000

z
Q

E z

W

00 11

0n
00

en-

l

Z
0

eq

as0

as00

aN %--00fnO
6TO

R

n

C)C

Q

cd

-t

l
001

-e
t

0

1Rc

R

10C1

et el-e

1:

r-\

oN

-

as 00C

W)~ 0

tn r

'

C) NT-

<D en

tn

90

"

n"

n

C'

0

0
-

-

-.

-

M 4.

w
P

0

42

F-

=
N 4

0=

~

0
00

=0
0

04 N04
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/1

u

00 0

0

48

Riggs and REHNQUIST
Proffitt: Rehnquist
JudicialPHILOSOPHY
Philosophy
JUDICIAL

Spring, 1983]

c

*

x CL

-N

0
ci

00

1.0

00 1000

0rl
o

tj

c

C)00

Ie

eo

o0

C)0

0cr"-~
a-

oo
L4

00
C~

Q
00 as ON
U~L

00 00

0.

0

c

u

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983

49

Akron Law
Review,
Vol.REVIEW
16 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 1
LAW
AKRON

0 10eno

r-~'I

Cc

orI-

[Vol. 16:4

rr-

O

-)

0

00 'TO

o

C1

t

cq

tn 0

1

(O

as
04
w

w

c

0C

en

r-

- k

W)

en

0)

U(

0

cu

cqs c
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/1

0

0 -00
00 W)rq

C
fn

r-

( r-~c

W)I
r;
00

en

en

~

~

4

cd

~ 0C~

Uc

0

H
50

